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Introduction Générale
La question des déchets et de leur traitement n’apparaît pas, de prime abord,
comme un sujet de préoccupation pour les économistes. En effet, ce sont des ap-
proches liées aux risques sanitaires en raison des pollutions possibles de l’eau, de
l’air, des sols, ou encore aux dommages environnementaux, résultant par exemple
des décharges à ciel ouvert qui concernent, au premier chef, les pouvoirs publics
et les riverains. En fait, les déchets, partie intégrante de toute société humaine,
sont des produits joints à la fois de la consommation et des activités de production
qui ont été longtemps ignorés. Cependant, l’augmentation significative des richesses
s’est accompagnée d’une augmentation de la production et de la consommation des
biens et services, qui se sont accompagnées d’une multiplication des déchets. C’est
ainsi que la gestion des déchets ménagers en France peut apparaître centrale au seul
regard des dépenses publiques qu’elle représente : en 2013 1, les dépenses liées à la
gestion des déchets constituent 33% des 46 milliards d’Euros alloués à la protection
de l’environnement, lorsque les autres domaines (air, bruit, sol, biodiversité, etc.)
occupent une part variant entre 4 et 8%. La France produit plus de 29,9 millions de
tonnes de déchets chaque année : non anticipée, l’élimination des déchets apparaît
tardivement comme un problème environnemental majeur en France, comme dans
le reste du monde.
1. CGDD, Aoôt 2013
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La gestion des déchets ménagers a suscité de nombreux débats, à la fois d’un
point de vue théorique et d’un point de vue empirique. Pendant très longtemps, la
question essentielle consistait à savoir de quelle manière on pouvait limiter la quan-
tité de déchets émise grâce aux différents outils de l’action publique. Dans un premier
temps, la réglementation a été privilégiée : il s’agissait de déterminer des normes et
des seuils d’émission pour les firmes afin de limiter la production des déchets à la
source. Assez rapidement, la discussion a porté sur le recours aux instruments prix.
Dès lors que les marchandises avaient une composante en terme de déchets, il était
alors facile de fixer une taxe ou une redevance directe. Mais la faiblesse des taxes
pratiquées a limité la portée d’une telle politique sur le volume global des déchets.
Une autre approche a cherché à qualifier et à comprendre le rôle des institutions
publiques dans la gestion des déchets, les mécanismes institutionnels et l’organisa-
tion de la collecte et du traitement des déchets par les communes pouvant avoir
un impact non négligeable sur la performance globale en terme de réduction des
quantités de déchets. Initialement conduits aux Etats–Unis puis développés dans les
pays européens, ces travaux ont cherché à estimer les coûts des déchets ménagers
et à comprendre leurs évolutions à partir de modèles économétriques de données de
panels sur de nombreuses communes.
Tandis que les politiques d’infrastructure sont aux mains des décideurs publics,
l’acte de réutiliser, de recycler ou de composter les déchets ne dépend que de la vo-
lonté des ménages. Autrement dit, si un ménage choisit de ne pas recycler ou séparer
des déchets, il n’y a pratiquement rien que le gouvernement puisse faire, car il est
beaucoup trop coûteux de vérifier la qualité et la quantité de déchets recyclés ou
compostés dans chaque foyer. Les tentatives visant à réduire le flux de déchets mu-
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nicipaux solides en augmentant le prix de la collecte, même si celles–ci s’avèrent être
efficaces sur l’augmentation de la quantité de déchets recyclés, se traduisent généra-
lement par une certaine forme de déversement illégal. Les consommateurs peuvent,
par exemple, jeter des déchets dans la poubelle de leur voisin, déposer leur poubelle
sur le lieu de travail, ou encore les jeter dans un champ ou une forêt à proximité.
Une autre possibilité bien plus problématique est apparue, les ménages peuvent éga-
lement jeter illégalement des déchets résiduels dans le flux de déchets organiques ou
recyclables. En polluant ces flux de déchets, ils augmentent les coûts de leur gestion
de maniére significative. Ces constatations ont conduit à introduire dans les analyses
les préférences environnementales des individus qui jouent un rôle clé dans la quan-
tité de déchets éliminés et recyclés dans les différentes collectivités. Cela a conduit
à l’apparition d’autres politiques économiques qui reposent sur la sensibilisation des
consommateurs (détenteurs de déchets). Ces politiques visant prioritairement à agir
sur la sensibilité environnementale des consommateurs semblent avoir eu un impact.
Leur sensibilité est en effet en progression, alors qu’un tiers des Français se déclarait
très sensible à l’environnement en 1995, leur part dans la population est montée à
plus de 50% en 2011.
Dans cette thèse, nous focalisons l’analyse sur le comportement des consomma-
teurs en matière de gestion des déchets. Ce choix a été motivé par le fait que les
producteurs ne peuvent agir que sur une fraction plus faible des déchets. En effet,
seuls 50% du poids total des déchets (les emballages) leur incombe. A contrario,
les consommateurs peuvent agir sur le volume total des déchets. De plus, la régle-
mentation européenne est peu regardante à l’égard des producteurs. En effet, la
responsabilité élargie des producteurs implique que ces derniers doivent contribuer
financièrement à la collecte, au tri sélectif et au retraitement des emballages mé-
15
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nagers que ces entreprises génèrent. Cependant, chaque pays est libre de mettre en
place le montant de cette “taxe” par emballage. En France, cette taxe était initia-
lement fixée à un centime d’euros par emballage 2 lorsque l’Allemagne prenait en
compte la taille et le volume de l’emballage dans le calcul du montant de la taxe.
Dès lors que la volonté politique n’est pas au rendez–vous, les collectivités sont
contraintes de se retourner vers les consommateurs pour atteindre les objectifs de
réduction. La compréhension des déterminants des comportements individuels de tri
sélectif des ménages devient alors essentielle pour la bonne orientation des politiques
publiques. C’est dans cette perspective que s’inscrit le travail développé dans cette
thèse. Nous chercherons ainsi à isoler les déterminants principaux du comportement
de recyclage et à émettre des recommandations en matière de politiques publiques
dans le but de réduire les déchets résiduels des ménages. Pour cela, la thèse sera
articulée en trois chapitres.
Le premier papier est une revue de littérature interprétative analysant les tra-
vaux économiques développés sur la thématique du tri sélectif dans un cadre que
nous définirons comme celui du “tri individuel au profit de la collectivité”. Cette
littérature met l’accent sur la modification des comportements des consommateurs
comme fruit de l’intervention publique. En effet, l’évolution de la réglementation,
peu exigeante à l’égard des producteurs, nous montre que les acteurs stratégiques
permettant d’atteindre les objectifs réglementaires fixés sont les consommateurs. Ce
survey permet d’une part de présenter et de confronter les travaux pionniers sur les
déchets d’un point de vue des consommateurs, et d’autre part de replacer les travaux
analysés par rapport à ce qui forme, de notre point de vue, l’originalité des déchets
2. Aujourd’hui en France le montant de la taxe comprend une partie fixe par unité d’emballage
à laquelle on ajoute un montant en fonction du poids de l’emballage. Source : Eco–emballage
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comme problème environnemental à réglementer. En effet, la logique budgétaire (i.e.
celle de l’équilibre financier) a longtemps été privilégiée dans la réglementation des
déchets ménagers (dans le calcul de la redevance par exemple). Toutefois, elle ne
peut être la seule logique réglementaire à devoir être prise en compte car cela re-
viendrait tout simplement à ignorer le coût externe. Un niveau de tri non optimal en
serait directement la conséquence. Si, à l’opposé, l’attention réglementaire était uni-
quement portée sur le coût externe et son internalisation, avec le développement de
politiques incitatives par exemple, le tri ne pourrait être effectif (i.e. le niveau de pol-
lution ne pourrait être abattu). En effet, le tri individuel nécessite qu’une politique
équipementière soit mise en place. Cette dernière introduit dès lors nécessairement
une préoccupation budgétaire. Or cette attention est généralement absente d’une
politique environnementale classique. Les politiques publiques de gestion des dé-
chets doivent donc se situer entre ces deux extrêmes. Cette originalité est dévoilée
par la manière dont nous avons défini l’unité de déchet qu’il est nécessaire de recy-
cler, et sur laquelle nous revenons tout le long du chapitre. Néanmoins, l’approche
traditionnelle de cette décision, où l’hypothèse de rationalité parfaite est posée, et
où le seul motif considéré est celui de la recherche de gains, a ses limites. En effet, les
facteurs personnels propres à chaque individu, émotions, influence de l’interaction
sociale, etc., doivent être pris en compte dans l’élaboration des politiques publiques
visant à modifier le comportement des consommateurs. Notre survey montre que la
problématique des déchets ne déroge pas à cela.
Ce survey a donc permis de faire émerger plusieurs résultats. Tout d’abord, une
partie de la littérature voit le problème de gestion des déchets comme une prestation
de services publics. Dès lors elle cherche à déterminer comment assurer ce service à
moindre coût. Cette vision ignore la dimension environnementale de la gestion des
17
Introduction Générale
déchets. Or, lorsqu’on ne raisonne que d’un point de vue budgétaire, on ne peut
comparer les éventualités de financement que pour une même quantité de déchet.
La dimension environnementale est donc d’une très grande importance et permet
de justifier économiquement les politiques publiques. Cet aspect est traité dans la
littérature par les études d’évaluation contingente sur le consentement à payer des
individus pour la gestion des déchets. Un consentement à payer faible des individus
signifie que les autorités locales ne peuvent pas espérer que les individus réagissent
correctement au problème de tri sélectif. Dès lors, des politiques publiques doivent
être mises en œuvre. En effet, le problème n’est pas tant de fournir un service pu-
blic de collecte des déchets, mais d’inciter les consommateurs à recycler. Pour cela,
les autorités publiques ont recourt à deux instruments politiques : les politiques
d’incitation et les politiques de diffusion de l’information. Concernant les politiques
incitatives, les études montrent que celles–ci ont un impact positif sur le comporte-
ment de recyclage des individus, toutefois, le signal prix ne sera effectif que si les
producteurs produisent des biens pour lesquels la partie “déchets” du produit est re-
cyclable. Ces politiques ont également pour objectif de modifier les comportements
d’achat des individus vers des produits générant moins de déchets espérant ainsi
engendrer un changement qualitatif dans l’offre des producteurs. Quant aux instru-
ments informationnels, ils jouent un rôle clé dans la gestion des déchets : les études
montrent que plus les individus ont des connaissances sur les programmes de recy-
clage, plus ils recyclent. L’éducation à l’environnement peut notamment changer la
complexité perçue de l’acte de tri. En outre, l’information est l’un des rares instru-
ments qui agit sur les comportements individuels à la fois en amont et en aval. En
amont, la prise de conscience de la production de déchets peut provoquer un change-
ment dans l’acte d’achat, en aval, les consommateurs peuvent adopter le recyclage,
18
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la récupération ou la réutilisation. L’outil informationnel semble toutefois être un
outil complémentaire aux autres instruments économiques. Plus globalement, les
taxes, les subventions, la consignation, la politique équipementière ou encore l’infor-
mation sur le tri, ne couvrent pas l’intégralité des politiques publiques à mettre en
œuvre pour augmenter le tri sélectif individuel. Ceci est la deuxième originalité de
la gestion des déchets comprise comme un problème environnemental. Le recyclage
fait en effet partie d’un comportement plus large des consommateurs. La littérature
en économie comportementale a montré que les décisions des individus réagissent à
d’autres facteurs que celui qui consiste à maximiser l’intérêt privé. Les normes so-
ciales, l’approbation sociale, la recherche de l’estime des autres, l’altruisme, les choix
d’autrui et le sens de la responsabilité peuvent être des déterminants importants des
actions individuelles. Le choix individuel de recyclage ne fait pas exception à cette
règle comme le montre la littérature émergente en économie comportementale sur
ce sujet.
Notre premier chapitre nous a permis de constater que rares sont les études qui
expliquent l’adoption ou non d’un comportement de recyclage, et plus rares encore
celles qui intègrent l’aspect comportementaliste. Toutefois, de nombreux travaux
sur les déterminants d’adoption d’un comportement de recyclage, et plus globale-
ment les déterminants d’adoption d’un comportement pro–environnemental, ont été
développés par des sociologues et/ou psychologues. Cette problématique des déter-
minants du recyclage individuel est étudiée dans le deuxième chapitre. Il n’existe à
notre connaissance aucune étude empirique cherchant à expliquer le comportement
des consommateurs dans le cadre du tri sélectif dans le contexte français. Les seuls
travaux existant sur ce sujet proviennent de pays qui ont une politique environne-
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mentale forte avec un taux de recyclage bien au–dessus de la moyenne mondiale.
En nous intéressant à la France, dont les résultats sont en–dessous de la moyenne
européenne, nous abordons la problématique sous un angle nouveau. Il nous est
donc paru intéressant de nous focaliser sur la région Provence–Alpes–Côte–d’Azur
(PACA), avant dernière région française en matière de gestion des déchets. Pour cela,
nous nous sommes appuyés sur les données d’une enquête originale et inédite que
nous avons menée auprès des habitants de la région PACA. Cette enquête a permis
de générer des données sur le comportement de gestion des déchets de 496 individus.
Les déterminants étudiés renvoient aux caractéristiques socio–économiques des in-
dividus, à leur préférence environnementale (pro– ou non– environnementale), aux
infrastructures mises en place par les collectivités, à leur condition de logement, aux
systèmes de fiscalisation ainsi qu’à l’influence sociale (l’influence des pairs). Sur la
base des réponses obtenues dans l’enquête, une étude économétrique, de type Probit,
a été réalisée. Celle–ci nous a permis de tester sept hypothèses formulées à partir
de la littérature économique sur les déterminants individuels du comportement de
recyclage.
Nos résultats empiriques corroborent en majorité les résultats de la littérature.
En effet, les comportements pro–environnementaux et non–environnementaux au-
raient respectivement une influence positive et une influence négative dans l’adop-
tion ou non d’un comportement de recyclage. Nos résultats montrent la relation
positive que l’on supposait entre la qualité des infrastructures des collectivités et
l’activité de recyclage. Ainsi, plus les collectivités mettent en place des équipements
efficients, qui facilitent l’acte de tri, plus les individus adoptent un comportement
de tri sélectif. Concernant la fiscalisation et plus particulièrement la politique de
taxe forfaitaire, les résultats obtenus sont contraires aux résultats observés dans
20
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la littérature puisque notre variable politique fiscale s’avère être non–significative.
Toutefois, ces résultats sont à prendre avec précaution. En effet, il n’y a pas d’hé-
térogénéité dans les fiscalités : l’ensemble des municipalités de la région dispose de
la même politique fiscale, à savoir une taxe forfaitaire. De plus, la réponse liée à la
fiscalité a été obtenue à l’aide d’une question hypothétique au sujet du mode d’im-
position, or les réponses peuvent être différentes entre une situation hypothétique et
une situation réelle observée. Enfin, l’originalité de notre recherche se trouve dans
l’étude de la variable influence sociale, essentiellement étudiée par les sociologues et
psychologues et peu par les économistes. La littérature montre une relation positive
entre l’influence des pairs et le recyclage. Nos résultats montrent certes une rela-
tion significative, mais négative sur le comportement individuel de tri sélectif. Nous
avons étudié l’influence sociale selon deux points de vue, premièrement la façon dont
se comporte notre entourage (voisins, proches) et, deuxièmement, la façon dont les
autres individus perçoivent notre façon de nous comporter. L’influence sociale est
dès lors considérée comme une norme sociale que les individus chercheraient en ob-
servant le comportement d’autrui. Nous pouvons penser qu’un individu (qui recycle
ou ne recycle pas) peut modifier son comportement pour se conformer au comporte-
ment de ses voisins. Toutefois, les résidents de la région PACA sont bien en–dessous
de la moyenne nationale de recyclage, ce qui peut amener à considérer que la norme
sociale en PACA est basse, voire de ne pas recycler. La relation négative que nous
observons entre l’influence des pairs et le comportement de tri est un résultat plutôt
surprenant dans la mesure où la plupart des répondants ont affirmé être recycleurs.
Pour ces derniers, nous supposons que le non–recyclage de l’entourage impacte né-
gativement leur propre comportement. Les individus peuvent se sentir découragés
et peuvent décider d’arrêter de recycler car ils estiment leur geste insignifiant aux
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regards du comportement de leurs voisins. Ces résultats réaffirment le rôle crucial
que peuvent avoir les instruments comportementaux, telle que l’influence sociale,
sur le comportement des individus. C’est pourquoi en dépit de résultats contraires
aux études pionnières dans ce domaine, nous pensons que de telles analyses doivent
être normalisées afin de mieux appréhender l’influence sociale sur les individus dans
les différentes collectivités ou Etats.
Nous proposons ensuite dans un troisième chapitre une analyse théorique qui
repose sur un modèle de simulation Multi–agents qui permet d’analyser les diffé-
rents moyens permettant d’influencer positivement les ménages au recyclage. Dans
ce cadre, la complémentarité des politiques publiques en matière de recyclage des
déchets est mise en avant, mais également leur efficacité face aux effets d’éviction.
Notre modèle s’intéresse à des ménages hétérogènes qui décident de recycler se-
lon quatre principales caractéristiques : leurs préférences environnementales, le coût
d’opportunité de leur dépense fiscale, le coût du tri sélectif et leur image de soi.
L’originalité de cette recherche, qui justifie par ailleurs le choix d’un modèle multi–
agent, réside dans la modélisation des interactions entre les ménages. En effet, les
ménages hétérogènes interagissent avec leurs voisins recherchant la norme sociale de
recyclage afin de décider de leur engagement dans le tri sélectif. Pour un ménage,
ces interactions créent une croyance sur la norme sociale de recyclage qui lui permet
d’évaluer son image de soi. Trois politiques publiques complémentaires sont consi-
dérées dans le modèle : la politique de taxe incitative, la politique informationnelle
sur l’importance du tri sélectif et les coups de pouce appelés “Nudges” qui corres-
pondent à une politique plus ciblée de communication sur l’activité de recyclage des
voisins (à l’échelle d’un quartier). Trois types de ménages sont représentés, les deux
22
Introduction Générale
catégories extrêmes les “Reds”, qui correspondent aux ménages qui ne se soucient
pas de l’environnement et qui ne recyclent pas, et les “Greens” correspondant aux
individus pro–environnementaux qui recyclent car ils en retirent une satisfaction
individuelle strictement supérieure aux coûts subits. Ces deux types de ménages
ne sont en outre pas influencés par leurs entourages. Les “Yellows” représentent les
ménages situés entre ces deux extrêmes et qui réagissent aux interactions. Les si-
mulations sont effectuées selon quatre configurations possibles. Les deux premières
correspondent à des cas de figure où les populations extrêmes sont majoritairement
représentées (60% de Greens ou 60% de Reds), une troisième configuration avec les
trois populations à proportion égale (1/3 Greens ; 1/3 Reds ; 1/3 Yellows) ; enfin
la dernière configuration, probablement plus réaliste, est composée pour 70% de
Yellows, 20% de Greens et 10% de Reds.
Les simulations numériques du modèle nous permettent d’observer l’influence
sociale, ainsi que quantifier l’effet d’éviction total sur les déchets résiduels. Nous
mesurons l’influence sociale par la différence entre les décisions de recyclage des
ménages lorsqu’ils interagissent avec leur voisin et lorsqu’ils ne le font pas. Les mé-
nages sont alors confrontés au même régime de politique d’information et de taxe.
Les différences observées dans les décisions de recyclage sont attribuables à l’in-
fluence sociale qui implique éventuellement un effet d’éviction. Nous constatons que
l’impact de l’influence sociale est plus important pour les valeurs élevées de la taxe
avec une population composée majoritairement de ménages “jaunes”. Les politiques
informationnelles quant à elles semblent retarder l’impact de l’influence sociale, et
ce quel que soit le type de population considéré. Cela peut s’expliquer par le fait que
toute augmentation de l’information impacte à la hausse les valeurs intrinsèques des
ménages. Lorsqu’on s’intéresse aux signes de l’influence sociale (par la moyenne de
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la différence entre les décisions de recyclage) on s’aperçoit que celui–ci est toujours
positif (dans notre modèle de base), cela ne signifie pas que tous les ménages sont in-
fluencés positivement par leur entourage mais seulement que celui–ci est dominant.
C’est pourquoi en plus de mesurer l’influence sociale nous avons cherché à mesurer
les fréquences d’apparition de l’influence sociale positive et négative. Quelle que soit
la configuration initiale de la population, pour des valeurs intrinsèque moyenne de
la population inférieure aux valeurs extrinsè moyenne que (paramètre du modèle de
base), les deux effets existent. Dans une situation où les ménages jaunes sont ma-
joritairement représentés, l’influence sociale est très largement positive. En ce qui
concerne l’effet d’éviction celui–ci apparaît lorsque la dérivée (∂r(ai, t)/∂t) est néga-
tive. La moyenne de l’effet d’éviction observée donne par conséquent, comme pour
l’influence sociale, une information sur la tendance dominante de cet effet. L’effet
d’éviction augmente avec des taux d’imposition faible et diminue lorsque le taux
d’imposition augmente. Les effets positifs et négatifs coexistent au sein de la popu-
lation, avec un effet positif dominant pour les paramètres choisis dans notre modèle
de base. Cependant, nous montrons également que dès lors que les croyances des mé-
nages sont telles qu’ils estiment que la population est plus pro–environnementale et
moins “greedy”, l’influence sociale et les effets d’évictions ont en moyenne un impact
négatif. La croyance des individus sur les valeurs intrinsèques et extrinsèques de la
population totale joue donc un rôle primordial dans notre modèle. Les simulations
nous permettent également d’apprécier l’impact du niveau de la taxe sur les décisions
de recyclage. Celle–ci agit différemment. Par exemple l’effet positif augmente avec
le niveau de taxe lorsque les ménages jaunes sont nombreux et diminue lorsque la
population est équilibrée. Enfin, la politique de “coup de pouce” est testée comme
une politique complémentaire à la taxe et à l’information. Cette politique donne
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des résultats mitigés. Elle n’implique pas nécessairement une augmentation du ni-
veau des déchets recyclés. Ce résultat n’apparaît que lorsque le voisinage considéré
recycle plus que le ménage qui recherche l’approbation sociale. Pour les ménages
jaunes, l’influence sociale accentue la décision de recyclage avec le coup de pouce.
De plus, la différence entre le recyclage optimal avec influence sociale et le recyclage
optimal sans influence sociale augmente moins vite avec la taxe sous politique avec
“coup de pouce”. Cette politique atténue donc l’importance de l’influence sociale
sur les décisions individuelles de recyclage, et augmente la réactivité des décisions
individuelles à la taxe. Nous allons à présent développer ces résultats de manière
approfondie dans chacun des chapitres qui suivent.
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Household Waste Recycling :
Economics and Policy
Chapitre 1 - Household Waste Recycling
Abstract
This paper provides a review of economic studies that analyse the use of multiple
policies to cope with waste management problems. In this paper, we discuss the fac-
tors that influence selective sorting behaviour and the most appropriate policies for
their promotion. The evolution of regulation shows that few constraints are placed
on producers’ behaviour and suggests that consumers will become strategic actors
to achieve regulatory objectives. Our survey shows, through various analysed works,
the originality of waste as an environmental problem to regulate. This traditional
approach that decisions respond to rational behaviour, particularly cost savings,
has its limits. Although not all public policies seem justified, we argue that specific
policies for promoting recycling may be required, preferably based on the provision
of information to consumers or on behavioural instruments. Indeed, personal factors
specific to each individual – such as emotions and the influence of social interaction
– should be taken into account in the development of public policies. For each ra-
tionale, the relevant literature is presented. Based on the review, avenues for future
research are identified.
Keywords : Household recycling, Waste, Behavioral economics, Public Policies
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1.1 Introduction
Many studies highlight an evolution of consumption patterns and the increasing
power of an ecological conscience likely to change consumers’ behaviours and their
choice criteria. Therefore, the growing group of “pro-environmental” consumers has
been identified. These consumers favour environmental and ethical criteria in their
consumption choices. At the same time, consumers’ requirements have resulted in
the creation of products and services that generate significant waste. In fact, the in-
crease of their volume makes waste management a major issue for public authorities.
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The European Commission, in its communication Resource Efficient Europe, esti-
mated that “Today in the EU, each person consumes 16 tons of materials annually,
of which 6 tons are wasted, with half going to landfill”.
Until approximately fifty years ago, the issue of waste management was not at
stake because it was directly handled by individuals : The metals were recovered and
remelted, the papers were turned into pulp, and organic waste was used as a natural
fertiliser in agriculture. (This model is still prevalent in developing economies.) With
industrialisation, plastics and “non-recyclable” waste has never stopped growing,
giving birth to the first discharge systems. Early in the thirty years of post-war
boom, Galbraith and Crook (1958) noticed a society producing an ever-increasing
amount of waste, without actually having the means to manage them.
In the 1970s, after France, the UK and Germany had already implemented a
national waste policy, a European waste policy emerged to harmonise the national
practices of Member States. A common regulatory framework has emerged as a
consequence and is now well established. European Directive 75/442/CEE sets the
foundation for the regulation of waste. It also defines the concept of waste as “any
substance or object of which the holder disposes or has a duty to dispose of under
the national provisions in force” (Art.1). This framework directive explicates a series
of common principles and responsibilities to which national waste policies must
adhere. It first conceives waste management as a public environmental policy that
has to manage with the externalities generated by waste and to promote selective
sorting to preserve natural resources. If the responsibility for waste management
is assigned to Member States in the text (Art.3), they must designate competent
authorities responsible for the implementation of the Waste Management (Art.6).
Local authorities are thus implicitly placed at the heart of the European system.
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The Directive 75/442/CEE does not, however, promote a constraining management
model or quantitative objectives. It leaves Member States the task of choosing the
instruments to promote waste management (Héritier (1996)). However, it urges them
to promote the prevention, reuse and recycling of waste. Binding quantitative aims
will appear in upcoming directives. Fifty percent of the total household waste weight
should become part of a separate collection by the 2020s to be recycled (Directive
2008/98/CE). Furthermore, the aim of reducing residual waste to zero is inscribed
in the European Commission Communication.
Though the instruments of the public policy for waste management are not spe-
cified, the “polluter pays principle” has been at the heart of the European regulatory
requirement since 1975. In this first text, the principle holds that “the portion of
uncovered costs by the recovery of waste must be the responsibility of the producer
at the origin of ‘the waste generator product’ or the responsibility of ‘the owner of
the waste’ ” (i.e., the consumer). The 2008 directive will stand out of this “residual”
vision of the polluter pays principle to affirm that the costs of waste management
(that is to say, its entirety) must be borne by the polluters. Two elements will thus
be particularly structuring for the intervention of local authorities in waste mana-
gement.
First, for more than thirty years, by asking that only the portion of the cost
of waste management uncovered by recovery revenues be paid by the polluters, the
European Commission has favoured an approach of local government intervention
organised around budget management. Thus, even if the dimension of externality is
acknowledged in the directives, levies on polluters do not have to act as price signals
that reflect the external cost of waste. By balancing the budget of communities
these, levies do not seem to be calculated to meet the rule of the equalisation of the
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marginal cost of pollution abatement and of the marginal damage, a central principle
of environmental regulations. By referring to the entire cost of waste management
to be paid by polluters, the 2008 directive opens the possibility to internalise the
costs of pollution, without, however, requiring polluters to pay them.
Finally, and again until 2008, the European texts gave the flexibility to choose the
identity of the polluter : the original producer or the consumer. Although this choice
is still present in the 2008 directive, the article on responsibility (Art. 15) constrained
it by asking that every initial residual waste producer “proceed themselves to its
processing or have it done” by a third company.
In France, for example, where the system has been in place since 1992, two pos-
sibilities are given to the industrial. The first one is to guarantee the management of
packaging waste with a deposit-refund system, reuse, garbage collection stations, etc.
The second one allows organisations approved by the State, such as Eco-packaging
or Adelphe, to obtain financial support. This system allows communities to fund the
development of waste management (creation of landfills, treatment facilities, collec-
tion systems). It is the solution that is the most used by industry. Far from being an
environmental policy, this system will not manage to stem the rise of non-recycled
waste. Since the implementation of these provisions and until the 2000s, the costs
of solid waste management have been increasing, with an average increase of 4.74%
a year (Dufeigneux et al. (2003)).
In the same vein, the European Commission is struggling to promote a model
policy that reduces beforehand the amount of waste produced. This objective is
adopted in the Communication of the Commission “Roadmap to a Resource Efficient
Europe” 1. However, no policy concerning producers has been suggested. Instead,
one can read that “(the Consumers’) purchasing choices will stimulate companies
1. COM(2011) 571 final
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to innovate and to supply more resource efficient goods and services”.
It is in this context that economists are called on to design economic policies for
improving consumers’ selective sorting or even to reach the quantitative targets set
by the regulations.
The objective of the paper is to survey a review the economic literature on selec-
tive sorting within the defined framework of “individual sorting for the benefit of the
community”. This literature focuses on the modification of consumer behaviours. In-
deed, the evolution of regulation shows that few constraints are placed on producers’
behaviour and suggests that consumers will become strategic actors to achieve regu-
latory objectives. This survey will be interpretive in the sense that it shows, through
the various works analysed, the originality of waste as an environmental problem to
regulate. The budgetary logic, as we have observed previously, has long been favou-
red in the regulation of household waste. However, it cannot be the only regulatory
logic because it would be similar to ignoring the external cost and would result in a
non-optimal sorting level. In contrast, if the regulatory focus were solely focused on
the external cost and its internalisation, with the development of incentive policies,
for example, selective sorting would not be effective. Indeed, individual sorting re-
quires public equipment. The latter necessarily introduces budgetary consequences.
Yet this attention is generally absent from the conventional environmental policy.
Thus, we see that public policy for waste management must lie between those two
extremes. However, this traditional approach that decisions respond to rational be-
haviour, particularly cost savings, has its limits. Indeed, personal factors specific to
each individual – emotions, the influence of social interaction etc.– should be taken
into account in developing public policies.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the regulatory and gover-
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nance framework of waste management. Section 2.3 introduces the use of economic
incentive instruments and their limits. Section 2.4 shows the incorporation of beha-
vioural instruments into practice. Section 2.5 presents the paper’s conclusions.
1.2 Regulatory and governance framework of waste
management
On the general theme of household waste management, the economic literature is
very diverse, tackling different issues. To put into perspective these various works, it
is useful to define, in a first step, the unit of recyclable waste, requiring a regulation
to ensure that it is recycled. Indeed, the parameters appearing in this definition will
help to locate the various works studied in our survey. In that respect, we consider
a unit of waste that yields a profit m when reused while simultaneously reducing
the external cost of waste CE. For regulations to be needed, three criteria must be
met. First, the individual sorting ex-ante (that is to say, at the source) should not
be profitable and therefore will not be automatically implemented. This situation
arises when the cost of individual sorting ci is greater than what it brings to the
consumer considered : ci > m.
Secondly, it is necessary for the ex-post sorting operated by a local authority
(that is to say, sorting the mixed detritus collected) not to be profitable, even if it
leads to the valorisation of the waste and allows for managing the externality of the
residual waste. Without this condition, sorting ex-post operated would be automa-
tically implemented by the community, and the regulation of individual behaviours
would be unnecessary. This situation occurs when the profit of reusing m and the
saving of the external cost of the non-recycled unit, CE, do not cover the cost of
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the ex-post sorting cc : m+CE < cc. Finally, it is necessary that ex-ante individual
sorting be socially beneficial even if it requires equipment whose reported cost to
the unit of waste considered is α. This situation occurs when the profit of reusing
m and the saving of the external cost of the non-recycled unit, CE, minus the cost
of equipment α, cover the cost of sorting ex-ante ci : m− α + CE > ci. Thus, it is
rational to incite in a regulatory way the development of individual sorting for the
benefit of the community if the valuation recycled concerned unit m is such that :
ci > m and ci + α− CE < m < cc − CE (1.1)
These inequalities define the units of waste that are relevant according to the
regulation, that is to say, those whose recycling generates an increase of the social
surplus and that need a regulation to be recycled. This economic definition of units
of waste to recycle implies that not all the units of waste need to be recycled. Only
those whose recycling generates an increase of the surplus of the company should
be 2. Considering this economic approach, the legal definition given previously in
the introduction focusing on the “nature” of waste appears much larger.
1.2.1 Regulatory framework
Regulations such as “command and control” have the main objective to prohi-
bit and/or limit the amount of pollution emitted by individuals. Public authorities,
through regulation, establish a pollution limit they consider socially acceptable and
implement appropriate public policies to achieve it. This is the most common lever
used by public authorities to curb pollution. This instrument can take many forms,
2. However, we can note that as m increases because of resources scarcity, the residual waste
decreases.
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it may (i) define environmental quality objectives, (ii) set a maximum quantity of ac-
ceptable pollution (x amount of non-recycled, recycled, incinerated or buried waste),
(iii) impose environmental equipment requirements (for instance, giving priority to
incinerators with energy recovery), etc. Although such a type of regulation helps
reach the environmental objectives (Barde (1992)), it rarely corresponds to an eco-
nomic optimum in terms of pollution 3 because policymakers do not know the actual
quantity of pollution emission (Baumol (1988)). Moreover, their effects are limited
by their non-inciting nature. Indeed, once the objectives are reached, individual pol-
luters have no incentive to continue their efforts ; they prefer to cut costs or even
fear that public authorities will further strengthen the regulation (Barde (1992)).
For example, as part of the management of household waste, the French law n
92-646 (13 July, 1992) recommends a reduction in waste production through the
implementation of separate collection and recycling schemes. Local regulations thus
set the rules on the collection and treatment of waste : which containers are allo-
wed for collection, the collection schedule (by day and time, type of waste), etc.
They also specify the penalties faced by people who do not respect the regulations.
These rules constrain the users. Indeed, if the authorities collect waste only twice
a week and set containers’ size, then individuals will be limited in their ability to
emit waste. The lower the number of collections, the more individuals must pay
attention to the quantity of waste they produce. Furthermore, if the municipality
decides to increase the frequency of collecting curbside recycling and residual waste,
it encourages recycling and composting behaviour. These ideas have been exploited
by Wertz (1976) and Gellynck and Verhelst (2007), who have shown that a high
frequency of residual waste collection has a positive effect on the quantities of waste
3. The economic optimum of pollution is achieved when the marginal cost of reducing the
quantity of waste is equal to the marginal cost of environmental damage associated with the
production of waste.
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produced. Conversely, a low frequency of residual waste collection would result in
a decrease in the amount of waste produced. This result can be explained by the
fact that in the case of a daily waste collection, people do not feel the need to be
careful about the quantity of waste that they generate because they do not have
storage problems. Stevens (1978) focuses on the density, frequency and proportion
of recovered material and shows that they have a significant effect on the total cost.
For example, increasing collection frequency would result in an additional cost of
19%. The study by Callan and Thomas (2001) confirms this finding. The authors
examine waste management spending (including the costs related to the disposal
and recycling of waste) in 110 municipalities in Massachusetts. They estimate, on
one hand, the cost of the disposal service and, on the other hand, the cost of recy-
cling as a function of the quantities of waste recycled or disposed, the frequency of
separate collections, the location of the disposal sites, the access to equipment and
state subsidies. They conclude that no economy of scale is observed in the case of
waste disposal, contrary to what is observed for recycled waste.
From this viewpoint, the problem of waste management is primarily understood
as a provision of public services. An important part of the literature focuses on
the question of how to secure these services at the least cost, as presented below.
Compared to the ideas expressed by the inequalities (1), this literature does not
question the value of regulation, or its form, but rather seeks the organisation of
waste management that generates the lowest cost (α) to the community.
1.2.2 Private versus Public Management of waste collection
In addition to the choice of waste collection methods, controlling collection costs
is a particular object of attention for local authorities. In this context, the direct
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management of household waste is often opposed to delegated management (for
all or part of the service). Direct management refers to a situation in which the
community bears the equipment costs (garbage bins, trucks, containers, garbage
collection stations, etc.) but also the cost of necessary staff. Delegated management
is instead the case in which the municipality delegates these obligations to one or
more companies, public or private 4.
The choice of delegating is often favoured because operating the waste collection
service generates significant specific investments and many costs (the cost of mana-
ging the containers, personnel costs, waste transportation costs, infrastructure costs,
etc.). The differences in the observed costs between local authorities are primarily
due to the size of the community, the quality of service offered (collection frequency,
type of service offered –curbside collection or garbage collection station), serviced
habitat types (individual / collective and / or rural / urban) and the fact that the
collection is directly managed or performed by private providers.
In their study on the cost of solid waste management, many authors have em-
phasised the fact that direct collection is more expensive than the delegated collec-
tion of service providers. Cost reduction is the most common justification given for
the privatisation of waste management. The first study of this type was conducted
by Hirsch and Engelberg (1965), who showed, using an econometric study on 24
municipalities in the region of St. Louis (Missouri), that there is no difference in
costs between public and private provision. Stevens (1978) also examined the cost
structure of 340 waste collection companies (both public and private) in the United
States. Stevens (1978) confirms the results of Hirsch and Engelberg (1965) for cities
with less than 50,000 inhabitants but also shows that in the case of cities of more
than 50,000 inhabitants, private providers use more efficient technologies. Indeed,
4. Generally, communities employ private companies (e.g. Veolia) for the treatment of waste.
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whatever the size of the city, private providers use fewer staff and a garbage truck
with a larger capacity than public monopolies, allowing them to achieve economies
of scale. An alternative approach was developed by Hart et al. (1996), who applied
the theory of incomplete contracts and property rights to the choice between public
and private production. Their results suggest that there are more incentives to re-
duce costs in the case of private production. The authors show that public provision
dominates when the decrease in non-compressible costs causes a decrease in the
quality of the service. However, as long as the reduction in the quality of services
offered can be controlled by contracts or competition, then privatisation is more ef-
ficient. Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) also studied the differences in the cost of waste
management in the case of public or private provision for 85 Dutch municipalities.
The authors show that in general, the private provision of waste collection is more
effective, achieving a 5% reduction in total costs compared with a public service
provider.
Other studies have shown that differences in the costs between public and private
management collection are not necessarily significant. Bel and Costas (2006), for
example, qualify these results when considering the long term : Studying 186 Spanish
municipalities, and comparing cities with privatised public provision to cities having
maintained a public service, they conclude that there is no significant cost difference.
The authors explain this result by the fact that the benefits of privatisation would
be eroded over time, as confirmed by the study of Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007).
Finally, Bel et al. (2010) conducted a “meta–analysis” with 27 studies involving very
different municipalities to compare the production costs of public and private waste
management. The authors assume that competition among private service providers
lowers the costs of waste management. Their study did not reveal a systematic
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relationship between cost savings and private production.
Focusing on the cost minimisation of the supply of only the public service, the
literature on delegated management ignores the environmental dimension of waste
management. Reasoning by fiscal logic includes only comparing to an identical
amount of waste two funding opportunities. Focusing more specifically on selec-
tive sorting, we could wonder about the efficacy of the alternative providers. This
question has not been tackled yet by the economic literature. The environmental
dimension is, however, of utmost importance and gives economic rationales for pu-
blic policy. A large part of the literature addresses this issue “at the roots”, i.e.,
evaluates individuals’ willingness to pay for waste management.
1.2.3 Evaluations of the willingness to pay
The willingness to pay evaluates the monetary value that people attribute to
environmental goods and services. It can be assessed using a contingent valuation
method that involves interviewing individuals in a survey about their willingness to
pay for environmental quality improvement. This method yields an estimate of the
surveyed individuals’ willingness to pay for an environmental asset or their willin-
gness to accept an environmental asset (Beaumais and Chiroleu-Assouline (2001).
It is generally used to value a public good to improve the service offered by public
authorities. Individuals’ willingness to pay has also been investigated in terms of
household selective sorting (e.g., Lake et al. (1996), Sterner and Bartelings (1999),
Caplan et al. (2002), Berglund (2006), Aadland and Caplan (2006), Koford et al.
(2012), and Beaumais et al. (2014)). These studies have in common the idea of
rationalising public intervention. In inequalities (1), public intervention is socially
desired if the value that individuals attribute to recycling (m+CE) is high enough
40
1.2 Regulatory and governance framework of waste management
compared to its cost (ci + α).
Lake et al. (1996), for example, analyse the willingness to pay for curbside recy-
cling. In their survey, a majority of respondents are willing to pay for this service.
Other than previous recycling behaviour, none of the demographic variables affects
the individuals’ willingness to pay for curbside recycling. Notably, although socio-
economic characteristics affect people’s decision to pay, they do not determine the
effective payment’s level. Using a mail survey, Sterner and Bartelings (1999) studied
the willingness of 450 households in a Swedish municipality of Valberg to pay for
better waste management. Households were asked to answer the following question :
“How much more are you willing to pay in yearly fees so that another organisation
(such as the county council) would be responsible for taking care of the waste and
recycling problem ?” The purpose of this question is to determine households’ willin-
gness to pay for better waste management, which would not involve any effort or
personal work on their part. Sixty percent of respondents considered it unreasonable
to pay someone to sort their waste. However, when conditioning non-recycling be-
haviour, 23% of respondents gave a positive response, showing they would prefer to
pay in money rather than in time (and effort) for a rational management of waste.
Sterner and Bartelings (1999) also show that gender (female) and age (young) va-
riables have a positive sign, and education has a negative sign. This means that
women, lower-educated people and young people are willing to pay more for waste
collection. A study by Caplan et al. (2002) in the US, based on a telephone survey
of 350 households in the city of Ogden (Utah), also estimated the willingness to pay
for curbside recycling. This work focuses on evaluating three options to divert part
of the waste streams from landfill sites. The participants were asked to classify the
three options in order of preference. The first option was to continue with the tradi-
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tional system of waste collection, which consisted of depositing recyclables and green
waste in a container without separating them from other waste at a cost of $10.65
per month. The second option offered to separate green waste only for a maximum
additional cost of $2.00 per month. Finally, for a maximum additional cost of $3.00
per month, the last option allowed for the separation of green waste and recyclables
from residual waste. The results of the study show that two thirds of respondents
supported the expansion of curbside recycling and that demographic characteristics
influence household preferences for alternative waste management systems. More
precisely, men, residents over 45 years old, residents who have lived in the city for
over 10 years, and residents of low and moderate income (less than 30 000 USD per
year) prefer the option of “trash can alone” (option 1) ; women, residents under 45
years old, new residents in the community, and residents in the medium- and high-
income categories prefer the option of curbside garbage and green waste (option 3).
In a related study, Aadland and Caplan (2006) analysed the costs and benefits of
curbside recycling using a sample of households in 40 cities in the western United
States. They were interested in the willingness to pay (WTP) and used sampling
strategies to detect and mitigate hypothetical bias 5. They asked three questions.
First, “Would you be willing to pay $x for the service ?” Conditional on a positive
answer, the question would be repeated with a higher value for x and a lower one
in the alternative case. People who responded negatively to the first two questions
were asked the following : “Would you be willing to use the service if it were free
of charge ?” With these three questions, different categories of willingness to pay
could be built (the authors distinguished four of them). The results showed that
the estimated mean willingness to pay in cities is $5.61 per month and $3.42 after
5. Hypothetical bias appears, according to Hanemann (1994) and Diamond and Hausman
(1994), when people are requested to provide a maximum amount they are willing to pay for
a good or service, even if they do not actually have to pay for it.
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adjusting for the hypothetical bias. The authors also concluded that young people,
women, highly educated people, individuals motivated to recycle by an ethical duty,
members of an environmental organisation or those who judge their current collec-
tion recycling program as satisfactory consent to pay more.
Berglund (2006) analyses, using a Tobit model, individuals’ perception of re-
cycling activities in a municipality in northern Sweden. This commune is equipped
with a fairly representative system of municipal waste management in Sweden, where
households sort their waste at the source and then transport it to recycling centres.
The willingness to pay to discharge sorting activity to another person is estimated as
a linear function of socio-economic variables (income, gender, age, education, type of
housing) and other specific indicators, such as the distance to the recycling centre,
whether waste recycling collection is a requirement imposed by the authorities, the
perception of recycling as an enjoyable activity, and, most importantly, the green
moral index (GMI). The latter is a measure of moral motivation for recycling. The
results show that each explanatory variable, when statistically significant, is found
to have the expected effect (income, education, and the perception of recycling as
an enjoyable activity, are not statistically significant). Men, younger people, people
living in apartments or farther from recycling centres, people who perceive sorting
as a requirement imposed by the authorities and people with the lowest GMI tend to
have a greater willingness to pay. (GMI is a determinant of individual’s willingness
to pay for evading sorting waste at the source.) Moreover, the presence of moral
reasons for recycling results in a lower willingness to pay for another person to take
over the recycling activity. The actual cost associated with the recycling effort is lo-
wer than the time cost of recycling. The cost of effort is measured by the willingness
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to pay and the time cost of recycling by the opportunity cost of lost leisure. In other
words, the average hourly rate to pay someone else to recycle is lower than the mean
hourly wage. Koford et al. (2012) also estimate the willingness to pay for curbside
recycling with a contingent valuation survey. Six hundred residents of large cities
in the Southeastern United States were studied. The willingness to pay is captured
using three questions. The first is : “Would your household be willing to pay $X
per month out of its own household budget for curbside recycling, in addition to
the current monthly garbage collection fee ?” 6. The results show that people have
a mean willingness to pay $2.29 per month to participate in the curbside recycling
program. People with a high income and those who feel an ethical duty to recycle
are most likely to respond positively to the willingness to pay. The authors estima-
ted that an increase of $1.000 in income leads to an increase in the willingness to
pay of 0.0014, and an ethical duty to recycle increases the probability of consenting
to pay by 0.24. Beaumais et al. (2014) were also interested in the evaluation of the
willingness to pay in the case of household waste in Corsica Island. Their results
reveal that the owners and city dwellers would be willing to pay more to reduce
externalities associated with waste. They explain this result by the fact that owners
pay more attention to reducing externalities of waste because it has a negative effect
on the housing market and therefore the value of their home. Their results also show
that people aware that they already pay a fee on waste (16% of respondents) and re-
spond best to monetary incentives ; they are more likely to accept an increase in the
latter and thus show a higher willingness to pay to reduce externalities. Individuals
are aware of the situation of waste management on their island and the resulting
6. The certainty of the answer is measured using the following two questions and mitigates the
hypothetical bias for this type of contingent valuation. 2) Are you “probably sure” or “definitely
sure” that your household would be willing to pay an additional $X per month for a curbside
recycling service ? 3) On a scale from 0 to 10, how certain are you that your household would be
willing to pay $X per month to participate in the curbside recycling service ?
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externalities, and they want change.
Insufficient individual WTP reveals that local authorities cannot expect consu-
mers to properly tackle the problem of selective sorting. Public policy has to be
implemented for that. The problem is not so much to provide a waste collection
public service but to incite consumers to recycle. Two broad families of policy ins-
truments have been studied in this field : incentive policy and information delivery.
1.3 The use of economic incentives and its limits
The question addressed by the literature presented in this section is how to
incite households to recycle (and to support its cost ci as a consequence) when
such selective sorting is socially beneficial (m + CE − α > ci). Economic policy
instruments create monetary incentives that have a positive effect on the cost of
household behaviour. For example, if communities require individuals to pay a tax
or a fee for each unit of non-recycled waste, then these individuals will have an
incentive to reduce their pollution by increasing selective sorting to avoid paying
more. Similarly, if individuals receive a subsidy for each unit of recycled waste, it
is in their interest to reduce their residual waste. Hahn and Stavins (1992) show
that economic instruments give greater importance to the individual willingness to
reduce pollution emissions (households choose their own level and means of waste
reduction) than the one permitted by regulatory instruments such as “command
and control” described above.
The public service of household waste disposal is divided into two elements :
collection and treatment. As previously mentioned, local authorities are obliged to
manage waste, which can be financed in three ways. First, financing from the muni-
cipality’s general budget has the advantage of being very simple. However, it does
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not warn individuals about the cost generated by the production of waste. The se-
cond type of financing–the garbage collection tax–is commonly used, and it provides
resources to fund the collection and treatment of household waste. In France, for
example, the calculation of this tax is based on the home rental value and not the
income of the user. As a result, a low-income person living alone (thus producing
little waste) pays relatively more than a family with two incomes (and necessarily
produces more waste). This form of tax is also relatively simple to implement and
enhances users’ awareness of the existence of a cost for managing their waste. Howe-
ver, its flat rate does not send a “price signal” that leads individuals to reduce their
waste production. The third possibility is the incentive fee. Its operation is based
on three essential points (Bilitewski (2008), Reichenbach (2008)) : (i) identify the
generator of waste, (ii) measure the quantities of waste generated, and (iii) set the
price according to individual effort. The incentive fee corresponds to a unit pricing,
that is, a billing based on the quantity of waste generated (which can be measured in
weight, volume, bag or same subscription). The incentive tax therefore encourages
households to change their behaviour by internalising the negative externalities they
generate. However, it can also generate perverse effects–for example, some indivi-
duals may opt for uncivilised behaviour, such as illegal dumping, to avoid paying
the tax.
In the following, we further describe how the three major types of incentive
instruments (taxes, subsidies, and the deposit refund system) have been studied in
the economic literature We then show that the economic literature considers that,
to be effective, these incentive instruments must be coupled with other forms of
state intervention.
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1.3.1 Incentive instruments
Taxes
The first articles to focus on incentive pricing are essentially empirical. For ins-
tance, Wertz (1976) was interested in the city of San Francisco, where the incentive
tax was adopted as a mode of tariffing waste services. The study seeks to explain
households’ waste production decisions. The author models such behaviour by assu-
ming that households maximise utility, which is a function of consumed goods and
waste generated under their budget constraint, which includes the costs of waste
disposal. The model examines the effect of the incentive tax on the production of
waste for different levels of household income. The author compares the average
production of waste in the city in 1970 to the average amount of garbage produced
in other comparable cities in the United States that had not adopted this pricing
system. Wertz’ results suggest that the quantity of waste generated decreases as the
waste tax increases (the estimated price elasticity is -0.15, which means that a 1%
increase in the incentive fee causes a decrease in the amount of waste generated by
15%). In contrast, waste generation increases with income. This work was extended
by Jenkins (1993), who modelled both the residential and commercial demand for
the service sectors of waste management, especially including recycling as an op-
tion to reduce waste. Jenkins used data from 9 American cities, 5 of which had an
incentive tax pricing system. The author develops a model in which households’ uti-
lity positively depends on the consumption of goods and negatively on the quantity
of waste recycled. The model of utility maximisation of households suggests that
the level of household income, the price of consumer goods, the money received for
recyclable materials (deposit) and the incentive tax have an effect on the demand
for waste services. The latter is measured using as proxy the quantity of household
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waste. Jenkins concludes that the incentive tax is more effective than a flat-rate
tax to achieve a reduction in waste quantity in the absence of any possibility of
illegal disposal. She estimates that the introduction of an incentive tax of 0.8$ for a
32-gallon container reduces waste by 9.5% without a separate-collection system and
16% with one.
A series of works (Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), Nestor and Podolsky (1998),
Linderhof (2001), and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004)) has shown that the incentive
tax (based on weight, volume, bag or subscription) manages to reduce the produc-
tion of waste and increase the quantity of recycled waste, thus acting as a Pigouvian
tax in the form of a price signal. Indeed, the tax encourages individuals to buy pro-
ducts with less packaging and pushes the agricultural industry to change their offer
towards “greener” products. It also provides individuals with information about the
quantities of waste they produce while responsabilising their behaviour and simul-
taneously funding the waste management service. In addition, polluting individuals
may decide to pay a tax rather than change their behaviour. This means that the
effects of the tax are limited and it is not always effective in achieving its objectives.
Therefore, literature turns to other behavioural instruments that affect individuals.
However, if the community fails to achieve its objectives in terms of recycling, the
tax can be further increased. To summarise the mechanisms at play, we can see
two advantages to such an incentive system. The first relates to households be-
cause non-recyclers consumers pay more (like a penalty), and people who recycle
pay less. The second advantage is the fact that the introduction of an incentive tax
allows a reduction in costs related to the collection of residual waste. Although the
costs associated with selective collection increase, recycling waste corresponds to a
resource and can be later resold. Furthermore, Glachant (2003) and Ferrara and
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Missios (2005) show that this system of unit pricing not only increases households’
recycling but also causes a decrease in waste at the source.
In this series, the study of Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), for example, is in-
terested in the effect of the introduction of unit pricing on the quantity of waste
produced, the number and weight of containers, and the amount of waste recycled.
The authors estimate the quantities of waste generated by 75 households 7 in Char-
lottesville, Virginia, before and after the introduction of an incentive tax. In this
city, the traditional collection is provided by the city and financed by local taxes, but
recycling is voluntary, (Materials are deposited in landfills, and there is no curbside
waste collection.) In 1991, the community provided to each household a recycling
container and developed a curbside recycling program. In 1992, the city went from
a voluntary to an incentive pricing program that worked with stickers (unit pricing
of weight). Stickers are $0.80 for a 120L bag collected curbside or $0.40 for a 60L
bag ; bags without a sticker are not collected. A comparison of the waste stream four
weeks before and four weeks after the establishment of the tax was performed. The
results show a 14% reduction in the weight of waste collected and a 37% increase in
the volume and 16% increase in the weight of recyclable materials. However, after
taking into account the estimated illegal waste diversion, the decrease in collected
waste weight is reduced to 10%.
The consequence of the introduction of illegal waste disposal is an important
issue in this literature. It has been considered a negative effect of the incentive tax.
The reduction of collected waste as the result of illegal behaviour has also been
7. Ninety-seven households out of 400 agreed to participate in the study. The final sample
included 75 households with complete data
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emphasised (Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), Linderhof (2001)) : illegal dumping,
waste deposits in the workplace or at the neighbours’, and even the burning of
waste. Controlling these uncivilised behaviours is costly and difficult to implement,
particularly for collective housing, where the practices of individual households are
difficult to isolate. In their study, Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) provide a num-
ber of arguments against the establishment of incentive pricing. They first consider
the administrative and implementation costs to be too high. Second, they estimate
that 28 to 43% of total waste is diverted away from the legal flows. These results
are, however, to be taken with caution because another study by Linderhof (2001)
estimates these illegal disposals to represent 4-5% of total flows, that is, 13-17% of
the total waste reduction. These uncivil behaviours can be explained by differences
in individual levels of environmental awareness. However, the negative externali-
ties generated by the tax are difficult to measure, and these studies (Fullerton and
Kinnaman (1996), Linderhof (2001)) show that when they occur, the uncivil beha-
viours are insignificant or remain at the margin and diminish over time. According
to Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), the effect of the incentive tax remains more than
positive. Furthermore, the incentive tax is a source of income which, by encouraging
individuals to control their amount of waste, also reduces the waste management
costs. The authors consider that this system is fairer because each household pays
based on its use of the service.
Many empirical studies seeking to compare different pricing systems have fol-
lowed the study of Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996). Using a Tobit model, Nestor
and Podolsky (1998) estimated the total waste generated based on the chosen pri-
cing system. In particular, they compared a unit pricing rule based on bags to one
based on subscription. In other words, households have a choice of participating in
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the bags program or choosing a subscription system. Individuals who opt for bags
should buy them. The cost associated to waste disposal therefore depends on the
number of bags they use and the waste they produce. If, on the contrary, they opt
for the subscription, households choose the collection frequency (number of collec-
tions per week), the cost increasing with the frequency. The results of Nestor and
Podolsky (1998) showed that the system based on unit pricing bags leads to higher
reductions of quantities of waste than in the case of subscription. Taking another
approach, the study by Linderhof (2001) evaluates the effects of the introduction
of the first weight-pricing system in a Dutch municipality (Oostzaan). The authors
compare the behaviour of households before and after the introduction of the tax in
this county. They interviewed 3437 households (amounting to almost the entire po-
pulation) between 2 to 42 times until July 1993, that is, before the implementation
of the weight pricing system, and in September 1997 (a total of 42 months). This
panel data allow us to distinguish the effects of the new pricing system in the short
and long terms. In particular, the authors separately investigate behaviour regar-
ding compostable waste (vegetables, fruit and garden waste) and recyclables (glass,
textiles and paper). The weight of waste (alternatively compostable and recyclable)
is estimated as a function of the marginal price of waste, household composition,
size, and other determinants. Both regressions consider the tax effective in redu-
cing waste, and its effect is more significant for compostable waste. In addition, the
long-term effects are more important than the short-term effects : Price elasticities
are 30% larger in the long term. This suggests that the effects of pricing based on
weight are permanent. The results show that three years after the introduction of
this system, the annual collection of all waste had decreased by 42%, and the share
of non-recycled waste had decreased by 56%. However, the success of such a program
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can be explained by the fact that the Oostzaan citizens are more environmentally
conscious than average. (The mayor of Oostzaan is a member of GroenLinks, the
most environmentally political party in Netherlands). Through the implementation
of the tax, they produced smaller amounts of household waste and higher quanti-
ties of recycled waste. This result confirms the success of this system because when
households produce little waste, decreasing their amounts of waste is more difficult.
Therefore, the effect of weight-based pricing would be underestimated.
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) are also interested in Dutch municipalities over a
period of three years (between 1998 and 2000). These authors extend the work of
Linderhof (2001) by estimating the effects of four unit pricing systems (based on
waste weight, waste volume, bags, and collection frequency) on the production of
total, unsorted, compostable and recyclable waste. As determinants of the quantity
of waste under the different pricing systems, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) consider
a series of socio-economic characteristics 8. In addition, they tested whether neigh-
bouring municipalities without an incentive tax greeted some of the waste from
municipalities with unit pricing. Their results show that with respect to unsorted
waste, unit pricing is effective because it reduces the quantity of waste by approxi-
mately 50% in the case of pricing based on weight or on bags, by 27% in the case of
pricing based on collection frequency and by 6% when based on the waste volume.
As for recyclable waste, the amount increases by 21% in the case of a system based
on weight and by 10% in a system based on frequency, whereas the volume-based
system does not yield a significant effect on the quantity of recycled waste. In the
case of total waste, all four systems have a significant negative effect on the quantity
8. These comprised the municipality’s area, the average family size in the area, the number
of non-Western foreigners per inhabitant, the percentage of total inhabitants earning a median
income, the number of houses sold per inhabitant, the number of flats sold per inhabitant, an
indicator variable for small and large municipalities, and the percentage of the population older
than 65
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of waste produced. (The total amount of waste is the amount of unsorted, recycled
and composted waste.) The systems based on weight and bags are the most effec-
tive (they reduce the quantity of waste produced by 38% and 36%, respectively),
followed by the frequency system (21% decrease) and the system based on volume
(6% decrease only). Concerning the illegal dumping in neighbouring municipalities
without unit-based pricing systems, the result of the statistical analysis of Dutch
citizens does not provide evidence that surrounding municipalities collect part of
the waste of municipalities that have unit-based pricing systems.
Incentive tax policies appear to have an overall positive effect on the recycling
behaviour of consumers. However, the price signal will be effective if producers pro-
duce goods for which the “waste part” of the product is recyclable. Taxing producers
on the non-recyclable part of their product could therefore be considered a useful
complementary policy. It is also hoped that people will change their purchasing be-
haviour towards products that generate less waste, which will require a change in
the supply of production.
Subsidies vs Deposit-Refund
Subsidies are financial transfers towards individuals, communities and the private
sector to encourage waste reduction and the choice of a more sustainable waste
treatment (Taylor (2000)). They represent a price signal by increasing the revenue
of individuals who perceive them and are therefore conceived as promoting selective
sorting 9.
9. Taking a different point of view, De Beir et al. (2007) explain that it is necessary to sub-
sidise the recycling sector when there is no competitive waste sector and when the cost of reco-
very/recycling is high. Conversely, they argue that as soon as recycling activity is profitable, the
subsidy is not necessary
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Palatnik et al. (2005) examine the use of economic incentives in the management
of municipal waste to assess the potential benefits of recycling programs. This study
is based on in two cities in Israel : Tiv’on and Misgav. Forty-eight percent of Israeli
household waste consists of organic material, yard waste and disposable diapers,
which can be separated from residual waste and recycled. The people of Tiv’on can
choose between a voluntary and a mandatory policy. The voluntary policy offers
the participants to buy 500L concrete containers to separate organic waste from
the rest of the waste stream for $105, thus benefiting from a subsidy representing
50% of its value. The mandatory policy involves having a 90L container in front
of the habitats to store non-recyclable waste. Recyclable waste is stored at home,
and curbside collection takes place once a week. The voluntary system is easier
because residents do not need to store waste at home but drop it directly into the
concrete containers. As for the residents of Misgav, they may obtain subsidised
backyard composters for 50% of the price. In addition, if at least 80% of households
buy a home composter, then households will benefit from an additional discount of
$11.5 on the tax for local environmental services. The results show that when the
invoice prices of waste disposal services increase, the socio-economic characteristics
of households have a positive effect on the household decision to buy or not buy
a container sorting. In addition, the results show that when the containers are not
subsidised, people are not willing to pay the real price for them. This result indicates
that the opportunism effect generally attributed to this type of policy would not be
at work in this example.
The deposit-refund system assumes that when a consumer buys a product, the
individual pays an amount that will be refunded when returning the product or
sending it to a collection centre. The “price signal” thus emitted encourages consu-
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mers to adopt the expected recycling behaviour. This system is possible for reu-
sable or recyclable products and packaging. The deposit allows people to report
reusable products but also to bring back hazardous materials that should not be
mixed with other waste and high-value recyclable products (Attar (2008)). Several
authors (Dinan (1993), Palmer and Walls (1997), Palmer et al. (1997), Calcott and
Walls (2000)) show the effectiveness of deposit to decentralise the social optimum
in alternative of an incentive tax. Palmer and Walls (1997) present a theoretical
model of partial equilibrium in the market for a consumer good (consisting of raw
and recycled materials) that will ultimately be disposed of at the landfill. The model
takes into account individuals’ decisions of consumption and waste disposal but also
producers’ decisions concerning the use of inputs. The authors study the consign-
ment and a norm of the minimum content of recycled products (i.e., a product that
contains some amount of recycled material) to achieve a socially efficient outcome.
They show that without input tax on production inputs and a subsidy on recycling,
the norm is not sufficient to achieve an optimal situation (i.e., an optimal amount
of production). They justify this fact by noting that this norm encourages the use
of recycled materials but discourages the use of virgin material. When the marginal
productivity of recycled materials is high, the norm increases production, whereas
when it is low, it reduces it. In the first case, it should be taxed to reduce waste,
and in the second case, it is necessary to subsidise the output to avoid being below
the optimum. For the authors, the deposit system is a sufficient tool to achieve an
optimal situation that equalises the marginal social cost of disposal, combining pro-
duction tax and subsidy on recycled products. It is thus not necessary to combine
the deposit with an additional tax. However, the authors specify that subsidising
recycling encourages substituting raw materials, which may indirectly encourage
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consumption and waste generation. (The subsidy reduces the real price of a good
for consumers even though it is potentially polluting.)
A different partial equilibrium model of waste production and recycling is de-
veloped by Palmer et al. (1997). This model analyses public policies to reduce the
quantities of waste and evaluate the impact of different policies to reduce waste : a
deposit/refund system, advance disposal fees and recycling subsidies on 5 recyclable
materials (aluminium, glass, paper, plastic and steel). They assume that when so-
meone buys a product, it leaves a deposit amount that is reimbursed in part or in its
entirety upon returning the product. The deposit acts as a tax on the final material
by increasing its price by the amount of the deposit for non-recyclers. Consumers
who recycle obtain their refund. The authors then calibrate the model with supply
and demand elasticities from previous economic literature ; 1990 data of the price
and quantity for each type of materials are considered. Then, they compare the
three policies with respect to a 10% reduction of total waste. Palmer et al. (1997)
show that to reduce the total amount of 10% of waste, in the case of the recording
system, it is necessary to apply a deposit equal to $45 per ton. The same amount of
reduction in the total amount of waste can be achieved with two alternative policies
of deposit (advance disposal fees for an amount of $85 and subsidies for recycling
activity for $98 per ton) at least twice as expensive as the deposit. Furthermore,
the deposit has a double positive effect because it promotes both source reduction
and recycling. In a more recent study, Loukil and Rouached (2012) conclude that
the deposit system reduces the cost of waste collection but that when consumers
are irregular in their attitude, the deposit system is not efficient.
Fullerton and Wu (1998) develop a general equilibrium model that takes into
consideration households, producers and the influence of production processes deci-
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sions 10 on the flow of materials. In this same paper, the authors consider the different
pricing instruments that act upstream or downstream to be explained. They are also
concerned about how these instruments can be used to solve market failures in waste
management and achieve the social optimum. Fullerton and Wu (1998) show that
a consignment instrument is not sufficient to achieve the social optimum but must
be coupled with a tax on packaging. This result comes from the hypothesis that
packaging is not recyclable. Fullerton and Wu (1998) present several other policies,
many of which contain a subsidy for the recyclability and generate the social opti-
mum. Calcott and Walls (2000) show that when taxes and subsidies vary perfectly
with recyclability, a tax on products combined with a subsidy of recycling, such as
a consignment instrument, can achieve the social optimum. This is similar to one of
the conclusions of Fullerton and Wu (1998). Noting that different combinations of
taxes and subsidies can achieve the social optimum, Choe and Fraser (2001) show
that the flexibility of the instruments is only possible if the individual actions of
agents can be targeted by different economic instruments. These authors show that
the flexibility of policies depends on the ability of public authorities to introduce
necessary policy instruments to target the specific behaviour of economic agents.
These papers are used to show that the consignment system has several advan-
tages. First, it encourages people to bring back both recyclable waste (packaging,
etc.) and hazardous waste (car batteries, etc.) while allowing public authorities to es-
tablish a higher deposit for products with strong negative effect on the environment,
thus limiting illegal disposal costs. In addition, this system has a positive effect on
the amount of recycled waste, and waste is usually better recycled than traditional
curbside selective sorting (Lindhqvist (2000)). Finally, it generates income for hou-
10. The amount of waste generated by the consumption of goods depends on the production
process (Producers must take into account the design of their products and the recyclability of the
waste part product.)
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seholds in return for sorting behaviour. However, the consignment system assumes
that there is a market for recyclable and recycled goods that is stronger than the
market for residual waste. It is not included in the models that we have seen and will
have to take charge of and eliminate whatever happens. In addition, the implemen-
tation of such a system requires that there be sufficiently sorting centres and that
they be close to individuals so that they are not discouraged. Finally, the deposit
must be sufficiently high in relation to the required effort of the act of recycling.
The deposit-refund system seems, according to the studies, to be an effective
instrument to increase waste recycling. However, none of these studies discusses
who has to handle this deposit-refund system and the condition for this system
to be economically possible. European directives give the choice for firms either
to implement these systems so that they themselves manage the waste that they
produce or to donate money to an organisation to create a necessary waste treatment
infrastructure. These two options do not entail coercive measures to force producers
to implement such a system, thus clearing them of any liability. However, without
the willingness of producers, communities cannot choose between alternative systems
(because they will not have the necessary infrastructure there), even if they consider
them to be more efficient.
1.3.2 Complementary policies
The originality of waste as an environmental problem likely lies in the fact that
taxing alone (or subsidising) does not settle the environmental issue, as it would for
a conventional pollution. If the equipment policy is not developed simultaneously,
individual recycling cannot be efficient. Similarly, if information is not delivered
on recycling possibilities (where, how, what, etc.), consumers will inevitably under-
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recycle. Therefore, information and equipment policies are seen in the literature as
complementary to economic incentives to promote selective sorting (Aadland et al.
(2005)).
Information :
Informational instruments are tools that allow for the transmission of knowledge
needed by individuals so that they have, if they wish, the means to adopt ecological
behaviour. Indeed, these instruments are based on individuals’ personal commit-
ment and exploit individuals’ wish to change their behaviour. In the case of waste,
behaviour change can reduce the amount of residual waste and increase recycling.
That is why we say that informational instruments are voluntary instruments. Grol-
leau et al. (2004) define individual voluntary commitments as a situation in which
individuals are not forced by communities.
Unlike the instruments discussed so far, informational instruments are set up
not only by local authorities but also by organisations such as public institutions,
associations, educators, etc. and always with the same purpose : to make individuals
aware of their duty to adopt more responsible behaviour. Informational instruments
help individuals learn good attitudes and inform them of the means at their dispo-
sal. In other words, education and information shape responsible individuals who
are willing to act for the environment, not only for the sake of respecting nature
but also for a more rational management of resources. Environmental education is a
very important part of informational policy because it extends the range of people’s
concerns regarding environmental issues. In France, information campaigns at the
national level are managed by the Agence De l’Environnement et de Maitrise de
l’Energie (ADEME). Their campaign “Let’s quickly reduce our waste, it overflows”
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began in 2005, and its objective is to sensitise individuals about the importance of re-
ducing the amount of waste they produce. With the same objective, the ADEME has
implemented the “Waste Reduction Week”, which started in 2009 at the European
level. Unlike national campaigns, public institutions focus their communication on
a local scale. For example, a municipality can implement an interactive informative
map permitting the localisation and the description of garbage collection stations.
The first communication campaigns used ecological arguments to show the im-
portance of recycling but also to communicate the right gestures. However, over
time, communities have sought to discipline and educate individuals regarding the
norms of conduct (Rumpala (1999)). To do this, information campaigns can also
focus on the benefits (or harms) of (not) recycling (Lord and Putrevu (1998)).
Using a unique means, it is impossible to grasp the attention of individuals
with very different environmental sensitivities. However, because several groups of
individuals can be identified, specific awareness and education campaigns can be
designed. The advantage of the informational instrument is that this it is a tool
that can be designed in countless ways and reach the greatest number of people. In
fact, it may encourage behavioural change so that individuals become eco-citizens.
Thus, to make possible these more sustainable behaviours, information and educa-
tion campaigns are crucial and play many roles. On one hand, they sensitise people
on waste and their characteristics, i.e., the materials that make up the waste, the
potential resources that are thrown in the trash. They also allow individuals to be-
come aware of the difficulty of managing their waste and of the costs and losses
caused by non-recycling or not valuing waste. Waste has to be perceived as a reu-
sable resource and a source of income. Public and private organisations act in this
way. Informing individuals about the right gestures for recycling supports sorting
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and encourages households to sort (to sort either more or better). By adopting a
sorting behaviour, individuals act in favour of the environment and de facto reduce
their level of pollution (waste minimisation).
In the literature on this subject, some studies (Grodzińska-Jurczak (2003), Aad-
land et al. (2005), Kinnaman (2005)) examine the influence of information on indi-
vidual behaviour, and other authors focus on the knowledge necessary to overcome
environmental problems (Granzin and Olsen (1991), Pieters (1991), Oskamp et al.
(1991)). These studies allow us to confirm the importance of awareness and informa-
tion in individual recycling or waste reduction behaviour. From a general point of
view, to motivate green behaviours, Owens (2000) shows that it is better to inform
people about the future of the environment. Information campaigns that empha-
sise the catastrophic state of the world motivate people to change their behaviour
to become more environmentally friendly, even if it results in personal sacrifices
(Griskevicius et al. (2010)). Grodzińska-Jurczak (2003)’s motivation is to analyse
the effect of individuals’ good understanding / knowledge of waste on the increase
of selective sorting. He compares the behaviour of residents of different municipali-
ties, some having been informed by communication campaigns and some not. The
author shows that pairing a sorting program with an information campaign has
a positive effect on the reduction of waste because informed people recycle more.
Aadland et al. (2005) take an interest in setting up a curbside recycling program,
which they consider expensive. They conduct a cost/benefit study of 4,000 Ameri-
can households (survey data). The authors believe that individuals must subscribe
to the program that consists of sorting and bringing their waste to a landfill. For
this, they recommend communities to make available the necessary infrastructure
by carrying a parallel communication campaign around the service. This same idea
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is at work in a study by Kinnaman (2005), who considers that people are generally
favourable to recycling programs. They previously require an awareness and infor-
mation campaign on issues of waste minimisation through waste sorting. Individuals
exposed to this campaign acquire a greater knowledge of environmental issues, and
this knowledge has a great influence on recycling (Granzin and Olsen (1991), Pieters
(1991)). Indeed, Oskamp et al. (1991) show that recyclers have a greater knowledge
of recyclables and recycling locations than those who do not recycle.
A study by Iyer and Kashyap (2007) moderates the usual results of the literature.
Indeed, they show that although the informational instrument is effective, it is far
less so than economic incentive instruments. However, Iyer and Kashyap (2007) add
that the effect of informational policy lasts even after their removal, while it is not
always the case for others. The short-term/long-term distinction appears therefore
important in choosing policymakers in the policy of waste. Indeed, if communities
want quick results in changing the behaviour of individuals, then it will be better
to use incentive instruments. If, on the contrary, they want results that endure over
time and real change in the individual habits, then they should develop informa-
tion instruments that permanently affect behaviours. However, the informational
instrument is not an alternative to incentive instruments ; on the contrary, it is a
complement : The incentive policy acts directly, and the informational policy allows
for this change to persist over time. Another complementary policy to information
campaigns seems necessary : It is policy of public equipment. Indeed, without an effi-
cient infrastructure to make the sorting behaviour easier, recycling does not increase
(Knussen et al. (2004)).
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Equipment :
Equipment instruments are one of the major action levers of communities to
encourage recycling practices. Municipalities offer different types of services based
on the flow of collected waste (packaging, paper, glass, cardboard, etc. ...) and types
of collection (curbside collection or garbage collection station). These means vary
according to municipalities and do not have the same effect on the behaviour of
individuals. Sidique et al. (2010) show that curbside collection systems improve
recycling rates because they reduce the opportunity cost of households’ devoted
time for recycling. Garbage collection stations also promote recycling. However,
they are used by individuals who are already aware of environmental issues and are
ready to spend more effort on waste recycling (storage and moving). Thus, curbside
collection facilitates the act of recycling. This idea of effort is well developed in the
literature. Oskamp et al. (1991) and Guagnano et al. (1995) show, for example, that
the simple fact of having a selective sorting container increases the volume of recycled
materials. Many studies show that people are likely to participate in an activity if
it does not ask them to expend too much effort, i.e., if it is not too constraining (De
Young, 1993 ; Vining and Ebreo (1990), Folz (1991), Guagnano et al. (1995), Knussen
et al. (2004), Peretz et al. (2005)). Folz (1991) is also interested in this concept
and believes that recycling behaviour is greater when the effort to recycle is low
(reducing the distance a person must travel to recycle, eliminating the need to sort
by materials, collecting waste in curbside). The availability of services constitutes
a determining factor that influences the participation of residents in sorting (Folz
(1999)). In another study, Folz (2004) shows that what makes recycling services
more convenient for individuals is, first, the establishment of waste collection on the
same day as recyclable material collection and, second, to allow for the mixing of
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recyclable materials (glass, aluminium, plastic, cardboard, etc.) instead of separating
them (in separate containers).
A recent study analyses the influence of the introduction of selective recyclable
waste collection on household behaviour (Abbott et al. (2011)). Indeed, the authors
model the recycling rate for English local authorities based on socio-economic and
political variables (average annual income of the community, household size, popula-
tion density, frequency of collection by recycling methods, the size of the container,
the container type). The recycling rate is defined separately for green waste and re-
cyclables. They conclude that the frequency of residual waste collection is inversely
proportional to the recycled amount (but it is more important for green waste than
recyclable waste), meaning that a low frequency of collection increases recycling
performance. The curbside collection extension plays a key role in improving the
performance of recycling, the type of container for recycled materials and the lower
frequency of residual waste collection. In addition, they show that the collection
methodology of recyclable materials also has an effect on recycling rates (more for
recyclables than for green waste). The rate is lower for 50L containers, but it is hi-
ghest for non-reusable bags and containers on wheels. Among the studied volumes,
the container with a capacity of 120L provides a greater increase in the recycling
rate (+3.4%). Abbott et al. (2011) show that local authorities implement very dif-
ferent recycling policies. Some are interested in the frequency of collection, others
are interested in the size of the container or the container type, etc. We need to find
a service that minimises the cost of participation in time, effort and even storage.
These studies show that when a community sets up curbside waste collection
services, there is a greater participation on the part of individuals (the recycling
rate increases). Along the same lines, people recycle less when they go to garbage
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collection stations and recycle more when they can mix all recyclables in the same
container. Studies have also emphasised that the frequency of services offered and
the different sizes of containers influence the rate of participation in a recycling
program. The equipment instrument plays a facilitating role and therefore has a
direct influence on recycling behaviour.
To conclude, all the authors in the literature support the idea that information
plays a key role in waste management : The more knowledge individuals have about
recycling programs, the more they recycle. Environmental education can change the
perceived complexity of sorting. The informational instrument seems to be a com-
plementary tool to other economic instruments. These informational instruments
must be paired with the equipment offered by the communities that are in sup-
port of them. The complementary informational instruments can be designed with
diverse features and can reach a larger number of participants. These individuals
are becoming more attentive and more aware and will therefore be more reactive
to different policies. In addition, information is one of the few instruments that can
act on individual behaviour, both upstream and downstream. Upstream, with an
awareness of the production of waste that can change the act of purchasing to reduce
it, and downstream, through recycling, recovery or reuse. To reach the agreement of
a maximum number of consumers and thereby cause changes in fundamental beha-
viours, information and education on environmental issues have to be delivered to
everyone.
Taxes, subsidies, deposit-refunds, equipment policy, and information on sorting
do not exhaust the question of public policy to be implemented to increase indivi-
dual selective sorting. This is the second originality of waste management unders-
tood as an environmental problem. Recycling is indeed part of a broader consumer
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behaviour. However, the literature on behavioural economics has shown that indi-
viduals’ decisions respond to factors other than just maximising private interest.
Social norms, social approval, the search for others’ esteem, altruism and others’
choices may be important determinants of individual actions. The individual choice
of recycling is no exception to this rule, as demonstrated by emerging literature that
tackles waste management with the help of behavioural economics.
1.4 The incorporation of behavioural instruments
into practice.
In the previous section, we saw that a price signal (i.e., an economic instrument)
does not always have the desired effect, a reduction the amount of household waste
generated on an individual’s behaviour, as some people prefer to pay rather than
reduce their pollution. Therefore, it is necessary to modify individual behaviour by
other means. Applying behavioural economics to waste management reveals that
in equation (1) the benefit, m, an individual obtains from recycling is complex.
As explained below, m represents various measurements such as the importance
attached to the environment, the benefit conferred to peers’ esteem and the value
attributed to social norms.
1.4.1 The social norm
Regulation, equipment and economic instruments are the tools that have been
most studied by economists to account for the adoption of recycling behaviour. A
recent survey by Van den Bergh (2008) highlights studies that show that people are
not solely motivated by financial compensation. Van den Bergh (2008) notes that
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non-monetary instruments can also be used to induce desired behaviour. Therefore,
to change individual behaviour, it seems important to also focus on social factors
such as attitude, social norms and peer pressure. For this reason, behavioural in-
centives (i.e., behaviour change) are increasingly developed by public authorities.
Public authorities use behavioural incentives to influence individuals so that indivi-
duals adopt behaviours that are consistent with the general interest.
Psychologists and sociologists have extensively studied the influence of social
norms on individual behaviour. They have focused on the concepts of warm-glow,
social pressure or surroundings (Hornik et al. (1995), Cheung et al. (1999), Keste-
mont et al. (2003), etc.) and more recently, nudges. Lately, economists have also
incorporated these concepts into their analysis of waste management (Brekke et al.
(2010), Viscusi et al. (2011), Abbott et al. (2013), Cecere et al. (2014).) Although
the work of Bénabou and Tirole (2006) is not focused on waste, it is one of the
pillars of this literature.
Social norms correspond to rules of conduct in a particular group. In the 1980s,
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) related social norms to social pressure. Social pressure
is measured by the beliefs of individuals concerning the expectations of others (i.e.,
family, neighbours, friends) regarding their behaviour. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980)
assumed that an individual would adopt a behaviour if he or she feels that his
or her family, neighbours or friends attach importance to it. In the case of waste,
many studies, not always convergent, show a relationship between social norms and
recycling (Nyborg et al. (2006), Brekke et al. (2010), Viscusi et al. (2011)). For
example, Oskamp et al. (1991) and Schultz et al. (1995) show that participation
in curbside recycling is more prevalent when neighbours and friends participate in
the program because it creates a social pressure that encourages more people to
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participate in order to avoid negative judgment. Similarly, when social norms are
visible for everyone (e.g., making use of a recycling bin), Vining and Ebreo (1992)
show that the recycling rate is higher. The most recent work of Berglund (2006)
confirms the importance of social pressure on recycling behaviour, in particular
for children. Borrowing from Brekke et al. (2003), Nyborg et al. (2006) developed
a model of peer pressure. The authors assumed that a society can be completely
“green” (i.e., when everyone preserves the environment) or completely “grey” (i.e.,
when everyone chooses to pollute). An equilibrium follows from their model where
everyone acts according to the green norm or the grey norm. The social norm is
based on the hypothesis that moral motivation to act “green” is important if enough
people act in this way ; if not, moral motivation is low.
Social pressure can also arise through the influence of self-image. The model of
Brekke et al. (2003) assumed that individuals prefer to achieve and maintain a so-
cially responsible self-image. The more an individual’s behaviour approaches what
he or she considers socially responsible, the more his or her self-image improves.
The authors conducted a survey to determine the moral motivations that encourage
recycling and obtained 1,102 responses. Eighty-eight percent of individuals claimed
to recycle because they considered they had to behave in the way they would like
others to behave. However, 41% recycled only to be seen as responsible by their
peers. Declarative surveys, however, have limitations. For example, individuals may
declare one thing for the sole purpose of being perceived as individuals who res-
pect the environment while acting differently. Similarly, Ek and Söderholm (2008)
considered whether the consumption of some goods conveys a self-image of socially
responsibility. The utility of this self-image does not result from the consumption of
the good as such. Instead, an individual may decide to purchase a good more out of
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a selfish desire not to be judged by his or her peers than out of any altruistic desire.
For example, a person may decide to use reusable bags for shopping, not out of
consideration for the environment, but for the sake of how other consumers perceive
him or her. This idea is at the base of the model developed by Bénabou and Tirole
(2006). Indeed, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) distinguish the actions of an individual
based on two motivations : the importance of appearing pro-social versus being seen
as greedy. The authors model the effect these arguments have on reputation : the
perception others have of an individual’s behaviour. They also stress that this is at
the heart of the crowding-out effect.
The study of Brekke et al. (2010) tests social interaction of “duty–orientation”
using results from a survey on the behaviour of glass recycling in Norwegian hou-
seholds. A duty-oriented individual is defined by Brekke et al. (2003) as a person
who prefers a socially responsible self–image and who suffers a loss of self–image
if he or she does not fulfil his or her perceived personal duty of recycling. Brekke
et al. (2003) conclude that for a duty-oriented person, responsibility ascription is
an inference (i.e., the result of the learning process) and not a choice. Like Nyborg
et al. (2006), the authors supposed that when there is doubt about the right thing
to do, people infer their individual responsibility by considering others’ behaviour.
Concerning responsibility ascription, they suppose that responsibility is accepted if
the percentage of others who recycle glass is greater than a certain individual thre-
shold. Decisions may be motivated by duty-oriented recycling leading to interaction
effects from social learning of individual responsibility. A duty-oriented individual
will feel a self-image loss if he or she does not fulfil his or her perceived responsi-
bility to recycle. Such individuals distinguish the effects of direct social interaction
caused by preferences for compliance and indirect social interaction that stems from
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responsibility ascription. The direct effect is not affected by the degree of uncer-
tainty of individuals concerning the supposed behaviour of their peers, whereas the
indirect effect is completely affected by the supposed behaviour of their peers (e.g.,
the more respondents are confused about the recycling behaviour of their peers, the
less they will be willing to accept responsibility). They show in their study that
duty-orientation is a major determinant for declared recycling. They also show that
the willingness of respondents to accept recycling is influenced by beliefs about the
behaviour of others. This means that they take their responsibility not only from
peer behaviour influences but also from the certainty that they have about their
peers’ behaviour. Social learning of responsibility is statistically significant and po-
sitive, indicating that the propensity of people to assign responsibility increases with
the common thought on how to recycle in their social group. When responsibility
was already assigned, a change in the perception of the behaviour of others can
only affect individual behaviour directly. However, when the responsibility was not
initially assigned, an upward revision of the belief that recycling is common practice
in the immediate social group of an individual increases the probability of taking
responsibility, which has a positive indirect effect on recycling and also increases the
probability of direct recycling.
Peer effects or social approval can act as a secondary motivation factor. For Bé-
nabou and Tirole (2006), although some people are sincerely altruistic, motivations
to adopt “pro-social” behaviour can be explained by the desire to create a positive
self-image but also to establish a certain type of social esteem. The authors observe
that the behaviour of some people may not appear rational as individuals adopt
pro-social behaviour even though it costs them time, effort and money. The authors
emphasize the possibility for monetary incentives to crowd out reputation. For an
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individual, to have a reputation effect, his or her behaviour has to be seen by others
as the least greedy as possible. Reputational effects can decrease when individual
behaviour is perceived as following monetary incentives.
A recent study by Cecere et al. (2014) is based on a survey of 22,000 individuals
of all European countries in 2011. The authors highlight the factors affecting indivi-
dual recycling and waste reduction behaviour. First, they assume that agents only
respond to economic incentives offered by the government, such as taxes and sub-
sidies, then they consider the motivations that extend beyond economic incentives.
Responding to intrinsic motivation, agents may be altruistic and make environmen-
tally friendly choices, maximizing both their individual welfare and social welfare.
Cecere et al. (2014) show that in the case of extrinsic motivations, agents are en-
couraged to engage in pro-environmental behaviour because of external pressure,
corresponding to the reputational concerns defined by Bénabou and Tirole (2006).
Given the impact of social pressure on individual recycling behaviour demons-
trated by these studies, public policy encouraging recycling behaviour must then
integrate this new element to maximize effectiveness. ? study both the theoretical
and empirical impact of policies on waste recycling and upstream reduction deci-
sions of individuals, explicitly taking into account the potential interactions (com-
plementarity vs. substitutability) between these two types of decisions. The low
opportunity cost of recycling has a positive direct effect on recycling behaviour and
on peer approval, which positively impacts recycling decisions. Intrinsic motivation
for prevention (resulting from the level of knowledge of environmental issues and
individual pro-environmental behaviour) positively affects waste reduction. There
are reciprocal positive and significant links between the behaviours of recycling and
waste reduction. The authors suggest that the behaviour of recycling and prevention
71
Chapitre 1 - Household Waste Recycling
tend to reinforce each other. The authors also suggest that investment in environ-
mental education and increased pro-environmental attitudes of individuals can be
much more effective in the stimulation of waste prevention and to achieve the goals
of long-term sustainability.
In their study, Knussen et al. (2004) indicate that social pressure does not in-
fluence recycling (i.e., there is no significant correlation). They suggest that social
norms may operate at an early point of a recycling program, when a recycling pro-
gram is well-established, after individuals have had time to develop strong attitudes
(positive or negative) and they are not influenced by external social pressure. The
empirical contribution of Viscusi et al. (2011) is important because it studies the role
of “social norms” 11 on “pro-environmental” behaviour based on recycling of plastic
bottles. The authors evaluate both the role of personal norms (i.e., norms a person
imposes on others) and external norms (i.e., norms people perceive as imposed by
others). External norms take the form of a societal reference for appropriate beha-
viour or pressure to adopt environmentally friendly behaviour. Personal norms can
lead to pro-environmental social pressure on others when they are adopted by a part
of the population and can serve as a benchmark of appropriate behaviour that affects
decisions of others. The authors show that, even though the “internal private value”
variable is important, the “social norm” variable, reflecting the individual guilt, due
to the behaviour of neighbours, from not recycling, is not statistically significant.
This is the antithesis of all of the studies discussed earlier and suggests that social
pressure cannot be considered an effective method to change recycling behaviour.
Hage and Söderholm (2008), in a Swedish study, qualify these results. Indeed, while
the authors show that individual recyclers do not tend to be influenced by their
friends, family or other important people, “new immigrants” are. They explain this
11. They define social norms as “normatively appropriate”
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distinction by how, in general, when immigrants arrive in a new country, they are
not very familiar with the laws and regulations, and they do not understand the
language very well, which can lead to low levels of recycling participation. However,
over time, immigrants adjust to social norms of behaviour and sort (on average, im-
migrants recycle more than Swedish citizens). This means that immigrants are more
sensitive to the environmental dimension conveyed by the Swedish society than the
Swedes themselves.
Fornara et al. (2011) stress the importance of spatial distance in developing of
norms. They believe that people living close to each other behave more similarly
than people living far apart from one another. They show that this is particularly
true in the case of recycling if it takes place in a specific location. Abbott et al.
(2013) study the concept of social norms and adhere to the aspect of visibility. They
look with a theoretical and empirical analysis at the manner in which social norms
and the “warm-glow” affect the relationship between quality of recycling facilities
and recycling efforts. They believe that rather than imposing recycling levels on
individuals or implementing measures to guide individual behaviour, governments
should resort to measures that activate social norms. For example, implementing
curbside collect programs that make recycling more apparent to neighbours may
encourage the emergence of a social norm to recycle.
The social norm is often associated with the concept of “warm-glow”, which takes
different definitions depending on the author. Andreoni (1990) for example, defines
the warm-glow as a feeling of inner welfare that comes from performing good deeds.
Brekke et al. (2003) identify it as a positive self-image and consider that it is the
threshold at which individuals believe that their behaviour is socially responsible.
To Halvorsen (2008), this it is respect for social and moral norms.
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An important distinction may also explain the decision to recycle. Since 1985,
the psychologist De Young (1985) De Young has pointed that the reasons given to
explain the choice to recycle are the intrinsic motivation (i.e., based on altruism
or environmental awareness) and personal satisfaction. He suggests that people can
do a good deed for the personal satisfaction they derive from it without seeking
the promise of another reward. In addition, De Young and Kaplan (1985) show that
people concerned with ecology do not seek an economic advantage, but, instead, seek
the feeling that what they do is useful and beneficial. McCarty and Shrum (2001)
distinguish between people “in individualistic behavior” and people “in collectivist
behavior”. Collectivist individuals are more focused on groups and shared objec-
tives than individualists. They show that collectivist individuals attribute a high
importance to recycling because they have a tendency to think of future benefits to
society from recycling. In contrast, individualistic people accord a low importance
to recycling because they focus only on short-term benefits. Collectivists consider
recycling as more important and it is this belief which leads them to get involved.
In addition, there is an important distinction to be made between those who
support recycling and those who implement recycling behaviour. This is an issue
that is discussed in social psychology to determine how behavioural and cognitive
strategies can change behaviour. Hopper and Nielsen (1991) study both strategies
and pay particular attention to the hypothesis that recycling is a form of altruistic
behaviour guided by social and personal norms. They point to the fact that recycling
is costly for the individual (e.g., time and energy expenses) while its benefits are not
personal or even immediate, although they are advantageous to the whole society in
the long term. Andreoni (1990) develops the concepts of pure and impure altruism.
Pure altruism is a situation where an individual will improve the lot of his friends
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(e.g., buying a green product), whereas impure altruism is a situation where an indi-
vidual does not derive a benefit from improving the fate of his friends, but instead,
derives a benefits from the personal satisfaction of achieving something good. Barr
(2007) shows that three groups of independent variables (i.e., environmental, si-
tuational and psychological) can be identified as affecting the relationship between
the attitudes of households and environmental behaviour. Based on this, the au-
thor examines the determinants of three waste management behaviours : recycling,
reuse and reduction. Adopting the theory of reasoned action (TRA) to examine the
relationship between intentions and environmental behaviour, Barr concludes that
recycling, reuse and reduction should be reviewed independently because predictor
factors of these behaviours are different. In other words, even when recycling beha-
viour can be encouraged rather easily, reduction behaviours and reuse behaviours are
not so easily stimulated because they are affected by strong environmental values, a
good knowledge of environmental policy issues and other factors that require inno-
vative policy measures. Intrinsic motivation for prevention (explained by the level
of knowledge of environmental issues and environment friendly individual attitude)
positively affect waste reduction.
When the selective sorting of others and, more generally, the recycling social
norm are recognized as key determinants of individual choices to recycle, the ques-
tion for public authorities is how to activate these factors. From this perspective,
the use of nudges seems particularly promising.
1.4.2 Nudges to the rescue
The idea that traditional behavioural incentive instruments (e.g., monetary in-
centives) result in individuals making optimum choices is refuted by empirical ob-
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servation : the production of household waste in countries continues to grow. Public
authorities therefore deploy experiments, such as nudges, to control the production
of waste. Nudges appeared several years ago in the United States. For Thaler and
Sunstein (2003), the nudge “guides the choice of individuals to favourable decisions
for the community while respecting everyone’s freedom to act in his convenience.”
This approach is based on work in psychology and behavioural sciences that aim,
not to understand the tools to bring out decision making, but to understand those
who act on the adoption of reported behaviour. This consists in giving a “boost”
to the individuals to adopt solutions that benefit communities and are generally
consistent with the public interest.
The willingness of individuals to act in a certain way does not necessarily trans-
late into real action. Indeed, the investigation of the European Commission in 2009
shows that 93% of French citizens believe that climate change is an important pro-
blem. Nevertheless, in the same survey, only 33% declares to use a means of transport
with low CO2 emissions. Similarly, the fact that an individual is informed does not
lead necessarily to making the right choice. For example, being aware of the fact
that failure to recycle increases the cost of household waste disposal does not encou-
rage all individuals to recycle. These factors make difficult the choice to adopt green
behaviours. Nudges however influence decisions and individual actions by acting on
the perception that an individual has of the conduct adopted by a group. They
allow imposing an environment friendly option by making the option unique. For
example, by removing free plastic bags in shops, the default option for individuals
was to opt for reusable bags. This initiative helped to limit overconsumption and
pushed individuals to choose reusable bags. In France, the number of disposable
bags distributed in stores from 10.5 billion in 2002 to 1.6 billion in 2008 (Ministry
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of Ecology, 2010). In Washington D.C. in 2010, a tax of 5 cents on plastic bags was
introduced, indirectly causing a 66% decrease in the number of bags found in the
Potomac River between 2009 and 2010.
Another effect entailed by nudges consists of encouraging good environmental
practices so that they become social norms. For example, Schultz (1999) conducted
an experiment on waste recycling in 120 households in the city of Laverne, CA. For
a month, every day, households were informed about the number of families (i.e.,
their neighbours) who participated in recycling household waste and the quantity
of recycled waste. To obtain this information, a handwritten note, to strengthen
the proximity, was glued to their door. The author observed an immediate 19%
increase in the volume of recycled waste. Schultz adds that the effect lasts in time
because the observed increase continued after the end of the experiment. The nudge
is, therefore, informing participants about the behaviour of their neighbours by
providing information on the social norm of recycling in their neighbourhood.
However, using nudges to disseminate social norms may induce adverse effects.
Indeed, social norms can act positively as well as negatively on individual behaviour.
If social norms of behaviour adopted by the majority of population correspond to
behaviour disrespectful of the environment, then social norms will be disrespectful
of the environment and will have a negative effect. A study by Schultz et al. (2007)
focused on energy consumption of 1,000 Californian households and their neighbours
revealed that a nudge can also have a negative effect. Informing households about
their energy consumption compared with that of others in their neighbourhood acts
as a nudge diffusing a social norm. However, even though the results of their work
showed a decrease in energy consumption for households consuming much energy,
the results also show that low-energy households increased their consumption. Mo-
77
Chapitre 1 - Household Waste Recycling
reover, nudges do not impact all individuals in the same manner. This is confirmed
by the study of Schultz and Zelezny (2003), which shows that reception to nudges
depends on an individual’s level of altruism and the importance the individual gives
to environmental issues. Nudges will probably be important elements of the future
regulatory system.
1.5 Conclusion :
Since the 1970s, many directives and laws have been implemented to regulate
waste management to limit its production. New services such as curbside recycling,
drop-off centres, incinerators and garbage collection stations have thus emerged.
However, the implementation of all of these infrastructures and services proved
insufficient in limiting the increasing waste production.
In this context, in 2008, the European Union Commission set new quantitative
objectives for the purpose of reducing generated, stored or incinerated waste. They
have advocated for recovery, recycling and re-use of raw materials for this reason.
Such a policy requires changing patterns of consumption and production to decrease
the amount of waste. This requires not only providing the necessary infrastructure
to change individual habits but also putting the individual at the centre of the pro-
cess. To reach this objective, a behavioural change is needed : purchasing greener
products, recycling and composting, waste recycling are example of the required be-
havioural changes. The positive effects of such changes on overall waste production
appears when a substantial number of people comply with the process. In addition,
the changes in individual behaviours also impact the production technologies of
firms and the development strategies of firms. Firms must then adjust toward pro-
cesses and products more environment friendly and sustainable under the pressure
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of demand. The European Commission has formulated in its Communication : “(the
consumers) purchasing choices will stimulate companies to innovate and to supply
more resource efficient goods and services”.
The studies presented in this article evince that regulatory solutions alone, al-
though necessary, fail to reverse the trend of the increasing waste or even to change
consumer behaviour. Economic incentive instruments, however, which act via a price
signal, encourage changes in individual behaviour. Environmental taxation appears
particularly effective in the case of household waste. Indeed, empirical studies in
the OECD countries show that progressive taxation based on the weight of garbage,
called an incentive fee, is efficient. This form of taxation encourages and rewards
individuals to recycle and minimize the amount of residual waste. However, it is
difficult to assess and control the negative effects of these policies, as individuals
reluctant to comply may resort to illegal dumping to minimize their tax burden.
Although the effectiveness of economic incentive instruments is not challenged,
they do not provide a long lasting change in individual habits because their effects
last only as long as the economic incentive is implemented. In addition, tax mecha-
nisms can achieve maximum gain in terms of welfare only if they are paired with
informational and behavioural instruments.
Beyond this complementarity, the studies described in our article also show that
informational instruments through increased consumer awareness of the adverse ef-
fects of pollution, for example, allow not only the adoption of environment friendly
behaviour, but fosters its persistence even after discontinuation of tax policy. Wi-
thout information, people cannot understand the consequences of their behaviour.
However, knowledge of environmental issues alone does not guarantee the adoption
of the desired behaviour or the eradication of the problem. This is explained by the
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fact that there is a difference between intentions and effective actions of individuals.
The willingness to adopt behaviour and therefore to change habits may be limited
by generated costs (e.g., financial costs, time costs or even convenience costs). More
recent studies have increasingly highlighted the social aspect : awareness of indi-
viduals exposed to environmental information depends on the behaviour of their
neighbours, social norms or self-image with respect to society as well as financial in-
centives. In targeting a change in habits and individual practices, informational and
behavioural instruments seem to be a central pillar of waste management policies.
In conclusion, this literature review has enabled us to demonstrate the existence
of a variety of instruments for waste management. Although the literature suggests
that some of these instruments have greater effects on the behaviour of individuals,
it provides that a definitive hierarchy in representation is not possible. Indeed, they
have different effects, some acting on the long term and the others in the short term,
some of the volume of waste and some on behaviour modification. Most of the work
evaluates the effectiveness of one policy alone in isolation from other measures. In
real life, these instruments coexist, and the complementarities between them should
be taken into account and discussed seriously. From our point of view, it is necessary
to combine incentive mechanisms that force people to quickly adopt the desired
behaviour with behavioural instruments that change the preferences of individual
agents towards more environmental friendly behaviour.
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Abstract
Our paper aims at understanding the determinants of households’ selective waste
sorting behaviours, based on data from an original survey of 694 individuals in the
French PACA region. Contrary to the applied literature that mainly focuses on
countries with high recycling rates, we focus on a French region where the recycling
rate is the lowest in a country that recycles less than the average for European coun-
tries. We first apply polychoric principal components analysis to reduce the number
of explanatory variables to a set of six factors. In the second step, we use a probit
model to estimate the probability of sorting waste as a function of these factors. This
model tests hypotheses that emerge from recent literature on behavioural economics
that is applied to households’ selective sorting. This literature focuses in particular
on the social influence on recycling behaviour that has thus far been primarily stu-
died by sociologists and psychologists. The results of our empirical analysis confirm
some of the findings of the literature. However, these results also highlight unique
features ; we show that social influences have a negative impact on recycling. This
finding disagrees with most of the literature, which finds a positive relationship of
social influence on pro-environmental behaviour.
Keywords : Recycling, Waste, Public Policy, Econometric Modelling
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2.1 Introduction
Environmental problems in the 21st century have become a top priority for the
international community. The significant increase in wealth at the international le-
vel has been accompanied by an increase in the production and consumption of
goods and services. The amount of product packaging has grown as a result of
offensive marketing methods, shorter product life cycles, and multiple complemen-
tary consumption goods. However, the amount of packaging-generated waste has
been mostly overlooked, despite its huge contribution to the increased production
of household waste.
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In France, the waste management sector dominates national environmental pro-
tection activities. In 2011, the cost of environmental protection was estimated at 46
billion euros. Spending on waste management accounted for 33% of total spending,
while the spending share for other areas (e.g., air, noise, soil, and biodiversity) varied
between 4% and 8%.
In France 1, the waste situation has become critical with waste volumes growing
continuously. Waste management is at the core of current environmental policy. In
the past, several economic policies have been implemented, but it was not until
the Grenelle environment meeting in 2007 (Grenelle de l’Environnement) that a
specific plan for waste management was formulated. The target was to reduce the
amount of waste going to landfills or being incinerated by 15% and to reduce waste
production by 7% over 5 years. The national medium-term target is to reduce the
annual production of waste to 200 kg per household. Thus, reducing packaging
production and increasing recycling have become priority areas. However, there is
a gap between policy objectives and the actual implementation of policies by local
authorities..
In some French regions, the situation is particularly acute ; for example, in the
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA) region in 2011, the amount of waste per inha-
bitant (e.g., selective waste collection, waste, green waste and bulky waste) was 730
kg, compared with the annual average for French households of 592 kg 2. Recycled
waste shows a similar trend, with only 56 kg per inhabitant for the PACA region
compared with 77 kg nationally. Eighty per cent of recycled waste comes from pa-
ckaging. Although significant progress has been made in recycling, a considerable
amount of waste is still burnt or sent to landfills. To minimize these types of dis-
1. See “The evolution of waste volume in municipalities of the PACA region” (Figure 2 and
Tables 6 in the Appendix).
2. Source : ADEME, 2011
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posal, it is important to make policy choices based on an assessment of consumer
needs and behaviours and to then change consumer behaviours to increase attention
on recycling.
Since the early 1980s, various types of public policies aimed at reducing so-
lid waste and increasing recycling have been formulated and implemented in many
countries. Palmer et al. (1997) eemploy a theoretical model and econometric si-
mulation to show the impacts of various economic policy options related to waste
reduction. They compare three policies aimed at providing economic incentives for
reducing municipal waste : a consignment system, a recycling subsidy, and an ad-
vance fee for disposal. Sterner and Bartelings (1999) analyse the cost of recycling and
waste disposal in three Swedish communities that use three different structures (i.e.,
weight-based fee, frequency-based fee, and flat fee). Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004)
study different pricing systems in Dutch municipalities (i.e., weight-, frequency-,
volume- and bag-based systems). The essential question is how to limit the amount
of waste produced through the introduction of various economic policies. Market
instruments (e.g., taxes or fees) and regulatory instruments (e.g., norms) have been
at the centre of the debate, and standards and emission limits for firms have been
set in order to limit waste production at its source. However, the discussion quickly
moved to a market-based argument. When a product had a waste component, it was
straightforward to apply a direct tax or charge. However, the weakness of taxes and
inelastic demand limit the scope of these taxes on the overall volume of waste. Other
economic policies have been proposed alongside the push for greater consumer (i.e.,
waste generator) awareness.
We also need to qualify and understand the role of public institutions in waste
management. Institutional mechanisms and organized waste collection and treat-
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ment by municipalities could have a significant impact on overall waste manage-
ment performance. Several studies, primarily conducted in the United States, have
sought to estimate waste-related costs and to understand their evolution based on
econometric models and panel data.
Numerous national and regional trajectories have been explored in the field of
waste management. However, there is a lack of consensus about the optimal po-
licy. Local contexts and consumer behaviours vary but highlight the importance of
consumers in waste management.
The present paper aims to examine the factors that influence agents’ waste sor-
ting behaviours. This model tests hypotheses that emerge from the recent literature
on behavioural economics that has been applied to households’ selective sorting. We
are interested in whether inhabitants of the PACA region have certain characteris-
tics that result in poor waste sorting behaviour. Which public policies affect this
behaviour ? This literature focuses in particular on the social influence on recycling
behaviour that has thus far been studied primarily by sociologists and psychologists.
The results of our empirical analysis confirm some of the findings in the literature.
However, it also highlights unique features ; we show that social influences have
a negative impact on recycling. This finding conflicts with most of the literature,
which finds a positive relationship between social influences and pro-environmental
behaviours. Based on the results of our econometric study, we propose innovative
public policies that consider agents’ heterogeneity.
Section 2 reviews the waste management literature. Section 3 provides the results
of a survey on consumption patterns and consumer choices in the PACA 3 region
in France. The survey results provide unique and original data on the individual
behaviours and preferences of households, along with participants’ views about the
3. Provence- Alpes-Côte d’Azur, a region of France
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infrastructure that their communities have established. Section 4 presents an econo-
metric model of individual selective sorting, and Section 5 provides some concluding
remarks.
2.2 The economics, sociology and psychology li-
terature on waste management
This literature review on solid waste management is organized according to
four themes : economic instruments, information and equipment policies, residen-
tial conditions and environmental preferences, and social influence. These themes
provide the basis for the hypotheses that we test in the econometric analysis.
Economic instruments (e.g., monetary incentives) affect the benefits and costs of
different individual choices. Financial taxes are often considered to be complemen-
tary with incentive fees or taxes. The former are used to finance the costs of waste
management, the latter are used to encourage individuals to change their beha-
viours. Incentive fees act to reduce pollution by taxing polluters for their pollution
(Pigou (1924)). A tax incentive to pollute less (i.e., produce less waste) provides
an option for those individuals who would rather pay the tax than change their
behaviours. Incentive fees (e.g., pay-as-you-throw) seek to change household beha-
viours while supporting the management of household waste services. Miranda et al.
(1994) classify countries according to their recycling programs. Their results show
that imposing a direct payment on households allows for a more efficient waste dis-
posal system and increases the amount of recycled waste. Incentive fees are at odds
with the traditional system of financial taxes, which would apply a single rate per
household regardless of the quantity of waste generated by each household. Studies
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show that the amount of waste generated by households decreases with the imposi-
tion of user fees and the establishment of programs that increase public awareness
about waste issues. Most economic studies agree that a flat-rate pricing system that
is independent of the amount of waste produced is undesirable. The basic choice is
between an “input tax” and a “downstream tax” (Bartelings et al. (2004)). An input
tax could consist of a deposit system or waste tax that internalizes waste treatment
costs in the product’s price. An “output tax” could be implemented as a system of
tariff rates in which the amount of the tax depends on the real quantity of gene-
rated waste or indicators (e.g. the number of household members). A downstream
tax is an incentive tax. For Bilitewski (2008) and Reichenbach (2008), incentive fees
measure the amount of waste generated by each individual and then calculate the
costs of its management. A downstream tax can educate individual waste produ-
cers who are taxed according to the amount of waste they generate. The more that
people act responsibly by sorting their waste, the less they will be obliged to pay.
However, this solution generates negative externalities because individuals who are
taxed according to the amount of waste they produce may be driven to illegally
dump their waste to avoid paying its real cost. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) and
Bartelings et al. (2004) put the positive effects of this incentive into perspective by
showing that a reduction in collected waste might result from antisocial behaviour.
Studies show that we can expect significant levels of illegal disposal in response to
price-based waste policy.
These findings lead us to our first hypothesis :
Hypothesis 1 : Tax policy negatively influences sorting behaviour.
In addition to waste management policy, communities are implementing infor-
mation and equipment policies to support and encourage recycling. Studies show
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that user fees may limit the waste generated by households if programs that in-
crease public awareness of waste issues accompany these fees. For example, a study
by Iyer and Kashyap (2007) shows that information policies are less efficient than
incentive policies. However, their effects endure even after they have been with-
drawn, which is not the case with incentive policies. Information policies have a
smaller but longer lasting effect than incentive policies. Several studies also show
that information and knowledge are essential to increase recycling. Granzin and Ol-
sen (1991) show that the most frequent recyclers are those who spend more time
learning and accumulating knowledge about environmental problems from various
sources (e.g., books, magazines, newspapers, television). In general, specific know-
ledge on waste sorting and recycling is positively correlated with selective sorting
behaviour Oskamp et al. (1991). Research by De Young (1988) shows that levels
of knowledge differentiate recyclers and non-recyclers. Recyclers are better infor-
med about the subject. De Young (1988) shows that non-recyclers explain their
non-participation in recycling as resulting from a lack of information about how to
sort waste. Information policies are needed, but without a suitable infrastructure to
facilitate recycling, sorting will not increase. Knussen et al. (2004) show that facili-
tation increases sorting behaviour. They discuss the perception that sorting requires
specific resources. Peretz et al. (2005) find that more convenient recycling programs
and higher incomes lead to higher recycling rates. Folz (1999) considers the positive
effect of a reduction in the amount of effort required on increased selective sorting.
For example, the distance that the waste has to be transported to be recycled can be
reduced by eliminating the need to sort and by implementing kerbside collection of
recyclable materials. Berger (1997) shows that easy access to a recycling point is an
intermediate between socioeconomic factors and recycling practices. Other studies,
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including Guagnano et al. (1995), show that behavioural factors associated with
external conditions influence behaviour. Their main results show that the existence
of a recycling bin is positively correlated with sorting behaviour. Similarly, Vining
and Ebreo (1990) show that a lack of equipment has a negative influence on the
adoption of recycling behaviour. Abbott et al. (2011) show that recycling perfor-
mance improved in the UK with the introduction of kerbside collection, which eases
sorting. However, they also show that there are differences between local authori-
ties, which are free to implement different recycling policies (e.g., the frequency of
collection and the size and type of container). Moreover, the consumer policy paper
by Thøgersen and Ölander (2003) shows that a fee-paying group household delivers
more recycling material and compost than a no-tax group does. These results are
consistent with the proposition that government regulation communicates norms
and responsibilities and can thus enhance internalized motivation in the form of
moral norms.
These results lead to our second hypothesis :
Hypothesis 2 : Collectivity support positively influences sorting behaviour.
Location also has an impact on the availability and practicality of sorting equip-
ment. Many studies (McEvoy III (1972); Samdahl and Robertson (1989); Schwartz
and Miller (1991); Zimmer et al. (1994)) find a positive relationship between resi-
dential location and concern for the environment. Zimmer et al. (1994) demonstrate
that urban dwellers are more likely to care about environmental issues. Berger (1997)
shows that the size of the residential area is positively related to sorting activity.
From these results, we can formulate our third hypothesis :
Hypothesis 3 : Residential conditions affect recycling.
Many authors consider altruistic behaviour in discussing pro-environmental at-
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titudes. De Young (1985) finds that intrinsic motivation and personal satisfaction
are the most frequent reasons that inhabitants choose to recycle, which suggests
that people act in a good way not in expectation of a reward but for the personal
satisfaction that such acts bring. De Young and Kaplan (1985) show that people in-
terested in ecology are guided not by economic incentives when recycling but rather
by the feeling that what they do is useful and beneficial to society 4. Abbott et al.
(2013) show that the “warm-glow”, which is the personal satisfaction an individual
derives from an activity independent of any consideration of the result (Andreoni
(1990)), is a determinant of recycling behaviour. Hopper and Nielsen (1991) show
that recycling behaviour is an altruistic behaviour guided by personal standards.
McCarty and Shrum (2001) invoke the concepts of individualism and collectivism.
They show that individualism is negatively correlated with beliefs about the difficul-
ties associated with recycling, while collectivism is positively correlated with beliefs
about the importance of recycling. Collectivist (i.e., altruistic) individuals believe
that recycling is very important because they consider the future societal benefits
of recycling. Individualists confer little importance to recycling because they focus
only on the short-term benefits to themselves. Schultz and Oskamp (1996) show
that environmental attitudes are positively correlated with participation in an ex-
perimental recycling program. They insist on the essential role of recycling efforts
in the conversion of attitudes into actual behaviours. The idea is that if the amount
of effort required to recycle is high, only those with strong pro-environmental atti-
tudes are likely to recycle. Conversely, when the amount of effort required to recycle
is low, a slight or medium environmental concern may be sufficient to achieve the
4. This idea refers to the crowding out effect. Ballet et al. (2007) define this crowding out effect
as a reduction in individuals’ voluntary contributions after state intervention. They show that a
convergence effect occurs when individuals increase their voluntary contributions following state
intervention.
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behaviour.
These findings lead to two further hypotheses :
Hypothesis 4a : A “pro-environmental attitude” is positively correlated with
selective sorting behaviour.
Hypothesis 4b : A “non-environmental attitude” is negatively correlated with
selective sorting behaviour.
Sociologists and psychologists have primarily developed the concept of social
influence ; there is no empirical research on the economic impact of the social en-
vironment on recycling behaviour. Several studies (Cheung et al. (1999) ; Courcelle
et al. (1998) suggest that social pressure has a significant influence on consumer
engagement in pro-environmental behaviours (e.g., selective sorting. Ajzen and Fi-
shbein (1980) define the subjective standard in the theory of reasoned action. They
find that perceived social norms or social pressures are measured as individuals’
beliefs about the expectations of various social referents (e.g., family, neighbours,
and friends) about their behaviour, along with their incentives to comply. They
assume that an individual will adopt a behaviour if he/she feels that his/her neigh-
bours attach importance to it. In the case of waste, many studies examine the
relationship between social norms and recycling, although their findings do not al-
ways agree (Nyborg et al. (2006) ; Brekke et al. (2010) ; Viscusi et al. (2011)). Using
survey results, the study of Brekke et al. (2010) tests the social interaction bet-
ween “duty-orientation” 5 and Norwegian households’ behaviours in terms of glass
recycling. They believe that responsibility ascription is an inference (the result of
the learning process), not a choice, for a duty-oriented person. Like Nyborg et al.
(2006), the authors argue that when unsure of the right thing to do, people infer
5. Brekke et al. (2003) defines a duty-oriented individual as a person who prefers a self-image
as a socially responsible kind of person who suffers a loss of self-image if he/she does not fulfill
his/her perceived personal duty to recycle.
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their individual responsibilities by looking at others’ behaviours. Decisions may be
motivated by duty-oriented recycling, leading to interaction effects through social
learning about individual responsibility. A duty-oriented individual will feel a self-
image loss if he/she does not fulfil his/her perceived responsibility to recycle. They
distinguish between the direct effect, which is not affected by the individuals’ de-
grees of uncertainty about the supposed behaviour of their peers, and the indirect
effect, which is completely affected by this type of uncertainty (i.e., the more re-
spondents are confused about their peers’ recycling behaviours, the less they will be
willing to accept responsibility). They show that respondents’ willingness to accept
recycling is influenced by their beliefs about others’ behaviours. Peer behaviour thus
influences individuals, and they take responsibility based on their certainty about
their peers’ behaviour. Hopper and Nielsen (1991) explore the idea that selective
sorting is a form of altruistic behaviour that is guided by norms. They demonstrate
that recycling behaviour is compatible with Schwartz (1977)’s altruism model, ac-
cording to which behaviour is influenced by social norms, personal norms, and an
awareness of consequences. Recycling is costly for individuals in terms of time and
energy. There is no immediate or individual reward from recycling, but it is bene-
ficial for society, especially in the future. Hopper and Nielsen (1991) show that a
program that involves “block leaders”, i.e., residents who encourage their neighbours
to recycle, influences altruistic norms and increases recycling behaviour. According
to Bénabou and Tirole (2006), although some people are truly altruistic, others see
good deeds (e.g., charitable donations) as an investment in their social image to
establish or maintain social esteem ; they are concerned about what others think of
them. The guilt-averse model of Ellingsen et al. (2010) works in a similar way ; they
propose that people care about what others expect of them and develop a sense of
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guilt if their behaviour falls below these expectations. Abbott et al. (2013) show
that social norms have an effect on recycling behaviour. They recommend imple-
menting measures to enable social norms, rather than imposing recycling levels on
individuals. For instance, by setting up a kerbside collection program, recycling is
more visible to neighbours, which thereby promotes a social norm to recycle. Hornik
et al. (1995) demonstrate the strong relationship between social influences and the
propensity to recycle. They show that the social influences of neighbours, friends,
and family members encourage recycling behaviour. They define social influence as
the support of friends, neighbours and family members for recycling.
From these results, we can formulate our fifth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 : “The social influence” variable is positively correlated with selective
sorting behaviour.
The results for socio-economic characteristics vary to a greater extent and are
sometimes contradictory.
Results for the influence of age are mixed. Some studies show that older people
tend to recycle more (Granzin and Olsen (1991)), although Oskamp et al. (1991)
find no correlation between age and sorting behaviour.
The results are similar for gender ; some studies show that women are more
involved in sorting (Granzin and Olsen (1991) ; Stern et al. (1995)), and some find
no correlation between gender and sorting behaviour (Vining and Ebreo (1990)).
In relation to income, Granzin and Olsen (1991) find no significant relationship
between income and the adoption of sorting behaviour, although Vining and Ebreo
(1990), Oskamp et al. (1991), and Berger (1997) highlight a positive significant
relationship between individual income and recycling.
Finally, Berger (1997) finds a positive and significant relationship between edu-
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cation and sorting behaviour, while Granzin and Olsen (1995), Vining and Ebreo
(1990) and Oskamp et al. (1991) find no significant relation.
2.3 A survey of consumption patterns and consu-
mer choices in the PACA region
2.3.1 Data and survey description
This paper proposes an analysis based on a survey of consumption patterns
and waste management in the PACA region in France. The survey was conducted
between August 15, 2012, and January 15, 2013. It provides data on the waste
management behaviours of 496 individuals. The survey’s objective was to investigate
the determinants of recycling behaviour.
The questionnaire focused on three main household waste sorting activities. The
first part dealt with consumption patterns and consumers’ knowledge about en-
vironmental practices and the importance of the environment in their purchasing
decisions. The second part focused on respondents’ selective sorting behaviours, the
context (e.g., the different options available for waste collection, public policies, and
information on selective sorting from local authorities), and their views on public
policies, especially waste policy. The third part of the questionnaire asked about
the respondents’ general characteristics (e.g., date of birth, place of residence, and
income) 6.
We built an initial sample of 6,000 representative individuals based on the distri-
6. To increase the number of respondents, we asked local authorities (i.e., municipalities), po-
litical parties, universities and other local organizations to help disseminate the survey. Some
advertised it through their local newspapers or websites ; others used their social networks to en-
courage people to participate in the online survey. We also contacted political organizations and
asked them to inform their members about the survey ; two major parties responded favorably.
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bution of individuals in the PACA region (in terms of population), socio-professional
categories (corresponding to regional data provided by INSEE), and gender distribu-
tion. We obtained 694 responses and 496 complete responses from the initial sample
of 6,000 individuals. We have chosen our sample to be representative in terms of
gender. Our sample is gender-balanced : 50.4% of respondents are women (compared
with 52.1% in 2012 INSEE statistics) and 49.6% are men (compared with 47.9% in
2012 INSEE statistics).
2.3.2 Preliminary statistics
The online survey covers the six departments in the region with strong repre-
sentation in the “Alpes-Maritimes” department (41.1%). Seventy-six per cent of re-
spondents report waste sorting. However, 84% of recycled material is glass, and only
54% is organic waste. This difference may be due to the sorting/collection facilities ;
91% of respondents have a garbage bin, and 80% have a recycling bin. Seventy-six
per cent of respondents consider garbage collection stations (GCS) efficient. Among
those who consider them inefficient, 24% say that they are too far from their homes ;
16% say that they are often at capacity ; and only 6% say that more of stations are
needed. The propensity to sort waste is lower in younger people (younger than 25)
and increases with age. We note that sorting behaviour also increases with income ;
households with the highest incomes sort more. There is a high propensity to recycle
(94%) among people living in rural areas and among those who live in houses – 71%
of people who live in houses recycle organic waste, while 79% of people who live in
urban areas recycle organic waste. Overall, 50% of people recycle organic waste. It
seems that living conditions are an important influence on the recycling of waste.
Finally, our results show that individuals rarely sort only one type of waste. The
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highest sorting rates are for glass ; the practice has been in place for a long time and
has become habitual. Among respondents who say they sort waste, the majority
sorts all types and does so regularly.
Table 2.1 – Recycling by housing area and type of housing
Housing area Housing
Recycling Urban Rural Total Recycling Apartment House Total
area area
No Recycle 63 6 69 No Recycle 55 14 69
Recycle 323 104 427 Recycle 236 191 427
Total 386 110 496 Total 291 205 496
Table 2.2 – Distribution by department
Department Frequence Percent
Alpes Maritimes 204 41.13
Bouche du Rhône 174 35.08
Var 74 14.92
Vaucluse 34 6.85
Alpes de HP 6 1.21
Haute Alpes 4 0.81
Total 496 100
2.4 Empirical evidence
2.4.1 Polychoric principal components analysis
The literature review showed that the determinants of selective sorting behaviour
include specific public policies (e.g., taxes, penalties, information, deposit policy,
infrastructure, communication, and waste container availability), individual prefe-
rences (e.g., pro-environmental or non-environmental), individual behaviour (e.g.,
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Figure 2.1 – Distribution of recycling intensity by materials
social influence), and residence-related characteristics (e.g., place of residence and
type of housing). All of these elements were included in the 23 questions of our
questionnaire 7.
Before the probit analysis, which tests the propensity to use selective sorting,
we conducted a polychoric principal components analysis (Kolenikov et al. (2004)).
The initial step is implementing factor analysis. Factor analysis provides an empirical
base by creating fewer (but independent) variables from the many highly correlated
variables 8.
7. See “Survey questions on consumption patterns in the PACA region” (Table 7, Appendix).
8. Cronbach’s alpha, a coefficient of reliability used to test whether items are sufficiently inter-
related to justify their combination in an index, is estimated at 0.71.
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This technique also reduces multicollinearity among the explanatory variables ;
although the variables included in these factors are correlated, the factors are not.
These new variables are the “principal components” or “factor axes”. The factor
analysis results in 6 homogenous factor groups based on the 23 variables extracted
from our questionnaire.
The first axis refers to “pro-environmental attitudes” and individual environmen-
tal preferences based on the following variables : “environmental impact” (i.e., the
attention paid to the environmental impact of products purchased), “pay” (i.e., the
ability to pay more for environmentally friendly products), “environmental sacrifice”
(i.e., the willingness to make daily sacrifices to promote environmental protection),
and “changing one’s consumption at higher cost” (i.e., the capacity to change one’s
consumption pattern to protect the environment, even if it costs more).
The second factor, “collectivity support”, includes all of the means put in place
by the community to inform people about the local waste infrastructure and how
to sort waste (e.g., recycling/sorting guidelines and advertising campaigns), which
provide both positive and negative signals – the latter referring to the inefficiency of
garbage collection stations (e.g., too far away or too full). This factor also includes
recycling containers that municipalities make available to individual households.
The third factor is “social influence” – the influence of the sorting behaviour of
friends, family, and neighbours on individual behaviour, and the influence of their
opinions on individual sorting behaviour.
The fourth factor is “living conditions”, which includes type of housing (e.g.,
apartment or house), location (e.g., rural or urban), and the presence or absence of
a composter.
The fifth factor is “tax policy”, which represents the impact of introducing a tax
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policy on garbage collection and on individual behaviour.
The sixth factor, “non-environmental”, expresses the opposite preferences. This
factor includes variables related to a lack of concern about environmental issues.
“Environmental indifference” refers to individuals who believe that environmental
consequences are so far removed in the future that there is no reason to worry ;
“financial gain” refers to individuals who think that acting for the environment is
only worthwhile if there is immediate financial gain ; “environmental interests” refers
to the view that the general population is overly concerned about the environment.
Table 2.3 – Factor analysis
Item Loading Item Loading
Factor 1 : Pro-environmental Attitude Factor 4 : Housing conditions
Environmental impact 0.6515 Composter 0.7309
Change behavior to higher cost 0.8414 Habitat area 0.8268
Pay More 0.8207 Housing 0.9167
Duty Recycling 0.4704
Environmental sacrifice 0.6259
Eigenvalue : 4.22415 Eigenvalue : 2.06452
Item Loading Item Loading
Factor 2 : Collectivity support Factor 5 : Tax Policy
Recycling Can 0.4575 Policy tax on myself 0.9343
Recycling Coatch 0.7656 Policy tax on other 0.9446
Sorting Brochure 0.813
Advertising Campaign 0.7468
Garbage Collection Station Full -0.5884
Garbage Collection Station Far -0.5449
Eigenvalue : 2.71794 Eigenvalue : 1.78295
Item Loading Item Loading
Factor 3 : Social influence Factor 6 : Not environmentally
Opinion of loved 0.8797 Financial gains 0.5586
Opinion neighbors 0.8951 Environmental indifference 0.7100
Influence of neighbors 0.6368 Environmental interest 0.6861
Influence of friends and loved 0.6690
Eigenvalue : 2.41233 Eigenvalue : 0.827277
We also use a Mokken scale analysis to check the consistency of the results
of our polychoric principal component analysis. The Mokken scale analysis is a
unidimensional scale that consists of hierarchically ordered items that measure the
same underlying, latent concept. The Mokken scale analysis generates 6 scales based
on the same 23 variables used in the factor analysis. The scales regroup the same
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items from our ACP analysis, except for Scale 4 (i.e., “collectivity support”), which
excluded two variables (i.e., “Garbage collection station full and too far”) 9.
2.4.2 Econometric analysis
Having determined the factors, we can use a probit approach to estimate their
impacts on the probability that an individual sorts waste selectively. Our estimation
of recycling behaviour determinants agrees with the following model :
Recyclingi = β0 + β1Pro− Envirt− attitudei + β2Collectivity − supporti
+ β3Social − influencei + β4Housing − conditionsi
+ β5Tax− policyi + β6No− environmentalyi +Xi + ui
9. We can see the Mokken scale table in the Appendix.
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2.4 Empirical evidence
As our analysis uses a cross-sectional sample, we need to add a series of variables
to control for individuals’ socio-economic characteristics (e.g., age, sex, income, and
socio-professional category) based on questionnaire responses.
The results are presented in Table 5.
Table 2.5 – Probit
Variable Probit Marginal effects
Collectivity support 1.668634 *** 0.1417837 ***
(0.3613306) (0.03464)
Pro_envirt_attitude 1.081214 *** 0.0918707 ***
(0.1790691) (0.01938)
Social_influence -0.421314 *** -0.035799 ***
(0.1009366) (0.00915)
Housing_conditions 1.598155 *** 0.1357952 ***
(0.302206) (0.02818)
Tax_policy 0.1321436 0.0112282
(0.210833) (0.01805)
Not_environmentaly -0.4788503 *** -0.0406879 ***
(0.1147025) (0.0129)
Age_1 1.049034 0.0493061 *
(1.122592) (0.02984)
Age_2 1.631597 0.1934855
(1.083868) (0.1785)
Age_3 2.092668 0.1251056 *
(1.097529) (0.06892)
Education_1 1.011083 0.0374527 *
(1.133519) (0.01499)
Education_2 0.0410439 0.0033771
(0.3907318) (0.03107)
Education_3 -0.2134621 -0.0207348
(0.2676247) (0.02964)
Education_4 -0.3680625 -0.0398964
(0.2744822) (0.03743)
Wage_1 -0.0928763 -0.008329
(0.3531429) (0.03338)
Wage_2 -0.3317694 -0.0336921
(0.2747206) (0.03348)
Wage_3 -0.3765297 -0.0390304
(0.2689729) (0.03373)
Gender 0.2051438 0.0174696
(0.1928269) (0.01668)
_cons -0.9725729
(1.164903)
Statistics
Pseudo R2 0.3629
N 496
Legend : *p < .1 ; **p < .05 ; ***p < .01 ; Standard Errors are given in parentheses
The results of our econometric estimates show the correlations between our in-
dependent variables and the dependent variable.
First, in terms of individuals’ environmental preferences (“pro-environmental
attitude” and “non-environmental”), both variables have a significant impact on
105
Chapitre 2 - The determinants of household recycling
our dependent variable. “Pro-environmental attitude” has a positive and significant
impact on recycling behaviour. Looking at the marginal effects, we note that a
1% increase in “pro-environmental attitude” increases the probability of sorting by
9.18%. This positive relationship between pro-environmental attitude and recycling
behaviour agrees with the findings of Schultz and Oskamp (1996). They suggest that
their findings relate to important constraints associated with recycling. Moreover,
our “non-environmental” variable has a negative impact on recycling behaviour ;
a 1% increase in non-environmental behaviour reduces the adoption of recycling
behaviour by 4.07%.
These findings thus support Hypotheses 4a (“pro-environmental attitude” va-
riable is positively correlated with recycling behaviour) and its corollary 4b.
The variables related to the implementation of local public policies (i.e., “collec-
tivity support”) are positively and significantly associated with recycling behaviour.
However, the “tax policy” variable has no significant impact.
The “collectivity support” variable is positively correlated with sorting beha-
viour. If the infrastructure provided by the authorities increases by 1%, the pro-
bability of adopting a sorting behaviour increases by 14.18%. Local governments
provide more information about the available waste management services ; infor-
mation is crucial to achieve optimal sorting. Individuals need to know the routines
and locally available facilities. The work of De Young (1988) and Vining and Ebreo
(1990) show that complexity can have a negative influence on sorting behaviour.
This negative influence might be due to a lack of knowledge or information about
sorting. Many questions (e.g., “How do we sort ?”, “Where do we sort ?” and “Why
should we sort ?”) need to be addressed, which is usually achieved through aware-
ness campaigns that are organized by national institutions (e.g., ADEME) and local
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communities. The objective of these campaigns is to educate people and change their
behaviours. Communication can be focused, for example, on the benefits of recy-
cling and/or the disadvantages of not recycling (Lord and Putrevu (1998). Perrin
(2004) provides evidence of successful communication campaigns that are related to
kerbside recycling, while Knussen et al. (2004) show that, to be efficient, informa-
tion policies need to be complemented by an adequate recycling infrastructure to
enable sorting behaviour. Moreover, the presence of garbage and recycling bins in an
individual’s building is important. While bins may seem like an obvious necessity,
possession of these containers is not systematic, and some buildings do not have
storage space for garbage, particularly old buildings and those in old town centres.
In these cases, individuals have to expend more effort to dispose of their garbage.
They are forced to store it to avoid daily travel for recycling. Guagnano et al. (1995)
show that having nearby garbage and recycling bins positively influences the adop-
tion of sorting behaviour. Some newer buildings have facilities for waste containers
but not for sorting containers ; municipalities usually supply free garbage bins to
residents after the building trustee or house owner applies for them. According to
our respondents, many households do not have sorting containers.
Finally, our econometric estimation shows that the “tax policy” variable is not
significant and has no influence on individual sorting, although the sign is positive.
Note that all municipalities in the region have the same “billing” policy (i.e., a flat
tax rate) ; therefore, all users pay the same amount for waste management. Under
this tax regime, an individual who recycles pays as the same amount as a person who
does not. Moreover, the tax-related results were obtained by asking a question about
a hypothetical tax. The hypothetical nature of this question might have affected
respondents’ answers, as people might have given a different answer to a hypothetical
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question than they would have if a tax had actually been implemented.
In the case of sorting policies, local governments expect people to understand
that their participation in the program positively impacts the collective welfare.
Because of limited personal gains from sorting, free-riding behaviours may hamper
the effectiveness of these policies (Pieters (1991)). Incentive-driven policies (e.g.,
pricing policies for waste management) mean that free riders are financially penali-
zed (Maystre et al. (1994) ; Bartelings et al. (2004) ; Bilitewski (2008) ; Reichenbach
(2008). If the community implements a pricing policy for waste management, im-
posing new constraints on agents, not all individuals perceive and react to these
obligations in the same way. The obligation may generate negative behaviours in
some individuals who resent being told how to behave. Before selective sorting be-
came more generalized, individuals were not concerned with waste management
policies. It is necessary for individuals to understand the importance of their roles
in this process. Information and communication policies focus on the importance
of sorting (using financial and ecological arguments) and the sorting process (i.e.,
how to sort), both of which are needed to reduce the gap between awareness and
behaviour change.
The results for the impact of public policies support Hypotheses 2 and 3 ; there is
a positive correlation between collectivity support and sorting behaviour, and there
is a positive influence of container availability on recycling behaviour. We find no
support for Hypothesis 1 on the impact of tax policy.
Our analysis also considers social influence to identify social norms. Our results
show that social influence has a significant and negative effect on recycling, meaning
that neighbours negatively influence individual recycling behaviours. Social influence
can be considered from two perspectives, i.e., the way neighbours behave and the
108
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way that neighbours perceive an individual’s behaviour.
Our econometric results reveal a negative and significant impact of social in-
fluence on sorting behaviour. Indeed, if the “social influence” variable increases by
1%, the probability of adopting recycling behaviour decreases by 3.58%. According
to the social esteem model Bénabou and Tirole (2006), individuals care about how
others perceive them. They feel pleased if others admire them and ashamed of the
opposite is true.
To fit in with “others”, an individual (who recycles or does not) can modify his or
her behaviour to conform to the behaviour of neighbours. However, PACA residents
fall far below the national average for recycling, so the social norm in PACA is to
not recycle.
Traditionally, scientists assume that social influence positively impacts people’s
recycling behaviours. However, our study reveals the contrary. This result is sur-
prising, as most respondents claimed to be recyclers. For individual recyclers, we
assume that this result is due to the negative influence of their non-recycling neigh-
bours. Indeed, individuals might feel discouraged from recycling and stop recycling
because they think it is futile in the face of neighbours’ behaviours. Finally, the
literature and our results show that social influence seems crucial for recycling be-
haviour. However, contrary to pioneering studies, we observe a negative correlation,
which means that these results cannot be generalized. Despite these conflicting fin-
dings, such an analysis should become standardized to better understand social
influence and then improve or promote selective sorting behaviour in different col-
lectivities and countries.
As confirmed by our econometric results, the variables related to residence type
and location are important for sorting. Indeed, we note that the “housing conditions”
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variable is positive and significant. An individual living in a rural area or in a house
that has a composter is more likely to sort. When this variable increases by 1%,
recycling behaviour increases by 13.58%. Waste sorting requires organization but
also the necessary equipment for separating the different components. Individuals
living in houses recycle more, perhaps because they have more room to store sorting
containers than those living in apartments. This finding confirms that of Zimmer
et al. (1994) who show a link between residence location and environmental concern.
The authors show that individuals living in rural areas are more likely to care about
environmental issues. In addition, shared recycling bins may become “polluted” with
non-recyclable waste if some residents do not adhere to or know about the correct
recycling behaviour. This observation suggests that an individual who recycles is
more likely to do so if he/she does not share a waste bin ; we know what is in our
garbage, but we do not know what is in other people’s garbage. Additionally, people
living in houses may be less influenced by their neighbours’ negative behaviours.
An additional constraint for apartment dwellers is that collection equipment may
be located in other buildings. Collective housing rarely provides composters, which
reduces the probability of recycling.
Finally, our results show that the socio-economic characteristics have no impact
on the adoption of recycling behaviour.
We also tested the adjustment quality of our model and its degree of prediction.
The adjustment quality test shows that 88.11% of our predictions are good. The
goodness-of-fit test allows us to accept our initial assumption of a good fit. To test
the robustness of our model, we performed a logit 10, which confirms the results
obtained using the probit. Taken together, these tests confirm the model’s quality.
10. See Robustess test in table 8 in Appendix
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2.5 Conclusion and remarks
The adoption of recycling behaviour allows consumers to indicate their know-
ledge about the impact of waste on the environment. Refusing to comply with recy-
cling behaviour means that consumers do not care about the increasing amounts of
waste. Some respondents indicated that they would be willing to change their be-
haviour if it did not involve too much additional cost and effort. Therefore, we have
consumer diversity, but we highlight four types of consumers : the “green consumer”
(who acts to preserve the environment), the “blue consumer” (who is interested in
the environment but does not recycle because neighbours either do not recycle or
recycle carelessly, e.g., put material in the wrong containers), the “yellow consumer”
(who does not care about environmental issues but does not want his/her neigh-
bours and friends to know he/she does not care), and the “red consumer” (who
is not convinced about the need to recycle and is unconcerned by environmental
issues). The impact of different policies will differ for each type of consumer. For
example, a green consumer will likely be more receptive to the introduction of an
informational policy (e.g., sorting information), while a red consumer will be more
responsive to the implementation of a tax policy (e.g., an incentive). Sorting infor-
mation allows green consumers to increase their knowledge about sorting, while a
red consumer thinks that this information has no practical value, as he/she does
not sort. However, implementing an incentive policy will have an impact on the
red consumer ; even if he/she decides not to change his/her behaviour, the policy
has a direct impact (i.e., he/she will pay more for not changing his/her behaviour).
An efficient policy for one group may be ineffective for another, which is why it is
necessary to have diversified instruments that affect all consumers.
Our results show that social influence plays a crucial role in the adoption of
111
Chapitre 2 - The determinants of household recycling
recycling behaviour. The neighbourhood leader in the work of Hopper and Nielsen
(1991) promotes recycling behaviour. We believe that “green consumers” can act as
neighbourhood leaders to inform their neighbours about the means available to them
and to educate them about how to sort their waste. These neighbourhood leaders
can interact with local authorities to obtain the appropriate waste management
equipment.
Equipment policy (e.g., nearby containers) promotes recycling behaviour. There
may be a lack of space for storage containers or no collective community request for
a sorting container. The authorities should identify areas where sorting behaviour is
low and check to see whether containers are available to these households. They could
provide containers or increase recycling garbage collection stations for buildings
where there is a storage problem. The referent neighbourhood could play a key role.
Information policies are effective and should be maintained ; however, they must
be combined with efficient equipment policy. A known but consistently defective
(e.g., too full or too far away) infrastructure will discourage yellow consumers. All
types of policies must be increased to facilitate increased recycling.
The results for market instruments, especially for tax policy, are interesting –
they have no significant effect on recycling behaviour. We suggest the implementa-
tion of incentive policies. However, we cannot confirm that an incentive policy will be
effective ; our recommendation is based on results in the literature. To demonstrate
the impact of market instruments on recycling behaviour, our results would need
to be compared with the results from a community with an established incentive
policy, which would show whether people were more likely to recycle in the case of
a tax that was directly related to the cost of their individual behaviours (i.e., the
amount of waste they produced).
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The variety and complexity of policy instruments for waste management do not
allow us to say that one instrument is superior to another. The information and
equipment policies related to economic instruments (e.g., the flat tax rate) or other
incentives (Gunningham and Sinclair (1999)) show that the economics literature
considers these instruments separately rather than complementary. In reality, dif-
ferent policies coexist, and comparing the effectiveness of separate economic policies
thus seems inappropriate. All waste policy instruments have advantages and disad-
vantages because these instruments do not work in the same way on individuals with
different preferences and priorities. It would seem more appropriate to consider a
combination of several instruments, to combine the strengths of each of these se-
parate policies. In all cases, consumer choice and complementarity among different
public policies are key to the success of optimal waste management policies. Finally,
although beyond the scope of this study, reducing product packaging could reduce
the amount of waste.
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2.6 Appendix
Figure 2.2 – The evolution of waste volume in municipalities of the PACA region
of the volume of waste in France and PACA Region.pdf
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Table 2.6 – The evolution of waste volume in municipalities of the PACA region
2005 2007
Household Waste Recycled Waste Household Waste Recycled Waste
(kg/hab) (kg/hab) (kg/hab) (kg/hab)
Alpes-de-Haute-Provence 621.63 50.28 599.23 77.28
Alpes-Maritimes 708.6 43.74 721.26 57.24
Bouches-du-Rhône 721.69 35.11 635.83 39.59
Hautes-Alpes 716.6 84.9 710.51 83.15
Var 722.7 50.1 669.05 55.75
Vaucluse 652.18 49.21 660.11 49.36
2009 2011
Household Waste Recycled Waste Household Waste Recycled Waste
(kg/hab) (kg/hab) (kg/hab) (kg/hab)
Alpes-de-Haute-Provence 653.35 59.47 678.55 58.72
Alpes-Maritimes 729.64 61.52 770.35 65.57
Bouches-du-Rhône 695.45 40.94 698.18 42.21
Hautes-Alpes 759.51 86.69 750.97 91.06
Var 830.71 63.69 764.31 63.42
Vaucluse 682.24 57.51 711 59.49
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2.6 Appendix
Table 2.8 – Robustness test (logit)
Variable logit Marginal effects
Collectivity_support 2.841754 *** 0.112585 ***
(0.6665498) (0.03004)
Pro_envirt_attitude 1.970413 *** 0.0780641 ***
(0.3303198) (0.01632)
Social_influence -0.7489019 *** -0.0296701 ***
(0.182403) (0.00773)
Housing_conditions 2.883153 *** 0.1142252 ***
(0.554212) (0.02421)
Tax_policy 0.2046189 0.0081066
(0.3839565) (0.01534)
Not_environmentaly -0.8698022 *** -0.03446 ***
(0.2098263) (0.01075)
Age_1 1.801183 0.0432675
(2.077114) (0.03137)
Age_2 2.909886 0.1694221
(2.012563) (0.17765)
Age_3 3.767449 * 0.1118052 *
(2.038927) (0.06589)
Education_1 1.692056 0.0341077 *
(2.063739) (0.01868)
Education_2 -0.0103723 -0.0004127
(0.6777468) (0.02708)
Education_3 -0.450276 -0.0207595
(0.4704709) (0.0252)
Education_4 -0.6357919 -0.0316781
(0.4896928) (0.03062)
Wage_1 -0.0673167 -0.002722
(0.6593835) (0.02721)
Wage_2 -0.5503297 -0.0255759
(0.5061044) (0.02787)
Wage_3 -0.6661851 -0.0319606
(0.5009168) (0.02902)
Gender 0.4209085 0.0167434
(0.3504996) (0.01417)
_cons -1.849501
(2.152401)
Statistics
Pseudo R2 0.393
N 496
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Table 2.9 – Mokken scale analysis
Item Loevinger Item Loevinger
H coeff H coeff
Scale 1 : Tax Policy Scale 4 : Collectivity support
Policy tax on myself 0.92217 Advertising Campaign 0.46728
Policy tax on other 0.92217 Recycling Can 0.56390
Recycling Coatch 0.57753
Sorting Brochure 0.58617
H coefficients : 0.92217 H coefficients : 0.544921
Item Loevinger Item Loevinger
H coeff H coeff
Scale 2 : Social influence Scale 5 : Housing conditions
Influence of friends and loved 0.47325 Composter 0.48162
Influence of neighbors 0.48494 Habitat area 0.70014
Opinion neighbors 0.59906 Housing 0.51710
Opinion of loved 0.60814
H coefficients : 0.54040 H coefficients : 0.560267
Item Loevinger Item Loevinger
H coeff H coeff
Scale 3 : Pro-environmental Attitude Scale 6 : Not environmentally
Environmental Sacrifice 0.49749 Financial gains 0.33185
Duty Recycling 0.39334 Environmental indifference 0.40012
Environmental Impact 0.44664 Environmental interest 0.38044
Change behavior to higher cost 0.59647
Pay More 0.53267
H coefficients : 0.489028 H coefficients : 0.371106
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Chapitre 3 - Public policies for households recycling
This paper was written with Christophe Charlier.
Abstract
An important stand of the economic literature focuses on how to provide the right
incentives for households to recycle their waste. This body of work includes a gro-
wing number of studies inspired by psychology that seek to explain waste sorting,
and pro-environmental behavior more generally, and highlight the importance of
social approval and peer effect. The present theoretical work explores this issue. We
propose a model that considers heterogeneous households that choose to recycle ba-
sed on three main household characteristics : environmental preferences, opportunity
cost of their tax expenditure, and their self-image. The model is original in depicting
the interactions among households which enable them to form beliefs on recycling
and allows them to assess their self-image. These interaction are explored through
the model simulations. We point to how individual recycling decisions depend on
these interactions, and how the effectiveness of public policies related to recycling is
affected by a crowding-out effect. We consider three complementary policies in the
model simulations : provision of incentives to recycle through taxation, provision of
information on the importance of selective sorting, and a ‘localized’ approach that
takes the form of a ‘nudge’. We use the results of the simulations to quantify the
consequences of the crowding out effect on total residual waste. This paper makes
an original contribution by showing that when the individual decision is influenced
by an internalized peer attention, beliefs about others’ intrinsic and extrinsic values
can be more important than others’ observed behaviors.
Keywords : Household recycling, Waste, Environmental regulation, Behavioral eco-
nomics, Computational Techniques.
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3.1 Introduction
In its “Roadmap to a resource efficient Europe”, the European Commission dis-
cusses the “the possibilities of using waste as one of the EU’s key resources”. In this
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communication, sustainable consumption and production are presented as general
goals to be achieved in the near future, with households at the center of the propo-
sed framework. The European Commission believes “their purchasing choices will
stimulate companies to innovate and to supply more resource efficient goods and
services”. However, this is not the only solution proposed by the European Commis-
sion to reduce waste but it is illustrative of the importance of householders in the
Commission’s approach to resource efficiency, and its view in the various European
waste directives of households as the ‘holders of waste’.
An important economic literature adopts this perspective on how to give hou-
seholds the right incentives to recycle their waste. Households tend to ignore the
external benefits of their recycling activity (savings on natural resources, and re-
ductions in the external costs related to residual waste), and are concerned more
by its cost (time, necessary materials and space, inconvenience, etc.). Although the
concept of Green consumerism is becoming more widespread causing people to take
account of the value they attribute to the environment in their choices, appropriate
price signal (Fullerton and Kinnaman; 1996; Jenkins; 1993; Ferrara and Missios;
2005) and provision of information (Iyer and Kashyap; 2007; Oskamp et al.; 1991)
on the importance of selective sorting is considered in the literature as the main
drivers of waste public policies. The implicit image of consumers pursuing their
self-interests tends not to apply or only to a limited extent in the context of waste
management. Individual waste recycling is (even partially) observable by others,
and each household can see (even partially) what others do. Selective sorting is
seen as a behavior in which social considerations are particularly important. This
has led to a strand of work that draws its inspiration from psychology (Ajzen and
Fishbein; 1980; Hopper and Nielsen; 1991) and seeks to explain waste sorting (and
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pro-environmental behavior more generally), highlighting the importance of social
approval, peer effect, moral considerations, and the “warm glow” effect in individual
motives (Hornik et al.; 1995; Brekke et al.; 2003; Nyborg et al.; 2006; Brekke et al.;
2010; Viscusi et al.; 2011; Abbott et al.; 2013; Viscusi et al.; 2013).
Our theoretical work investigates the issue of recycling and the above described
effects. The model considers heterogeneous households that decide to recycle, consi-
dering four main characteristics : their environmental preferences (represented by
the intrinsic value they put on the environment), the opportunity costs of the rela-
ted expenses (represented by extrinsic money value), sorting costs, and self-image.
The self-image motive is evaluated in relation to the attention households pay to
what others think about their intrinsic and extrinsic values, in line with Bénabou
and Tirole (2006). This requires households to be familiar with the recycling so-
cial norm. The originality of our paper lies in modeling the interactions between
households that enable them to form beliefs about this recycling norm. We show
how individual recycling decisions depend on these interactions, and how this affects
the effectiveness of public policies on recycling. We consider three complementary
policies : provision of tax incentives to recycle, provision of information on the im-
portance of selective sorting, and localized ‘nudge’ approaches. These three tools
are then considered within a policy-mix.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the positioning of this
study in the existing literature on the recycling decisions of ‘socially responsible’
individuals. Section 3.3 describes the model. Section 3.4 presents and interprets the
results of the computational simulations of the model. Section 3.5 concludes.
126
3.2 Related literature
3.2 Related literature
This paper contributes to a strand in the literature which starts from a series of
observations. First, individuals in their everyday lives are involved in the provision
of certain environmental public goods with no necessity for government intervention.
Although the level of supply may be sub-optimal, it is generally not zero. Second,
classical consumer theory that predicts egoist individuals will behave opportunis-
tically falls short in explaining this observed provision of public goods (Andreoni;
1988). Third, the explanation that individuals seek the social approval of others
through their behaviors, is not the whole solution to the problem since, even in this
case, a no-contribution equilibrium cannot be ruled out (Rege; 2004).
In order to tackle the problems raised, some recent economic works (Bénabou
and Tirole; 2006; Brekke et al.; 2003, 2010; Nyborg et al.; 2006) consider individuals
with more elaborate rationality which gives rise to ‘impure altruism’ (Andreoni;
1990). These works consider situations where the responsibility for contributing to
a public good is not formally allocated within a regulatory framework. Thus, indi-
vidual responsibility is a subjective motive within the individual’s utility functions.
In this context, the ‘warm glow effect of giving’ has been explored within the public
good framework where individual contribution to the public good, although socially
desirable, yields less than its cost to the individual. To evaluate the ‘warm glow’
effect requires individual familiarity with the social norm.
These works differ in how social norm is conceived and used in the theoreti-
cal models. In Bénabou and Tirole (2006), a reputation payoff is added to utility
to capture the idea that individuals value others’ opinions of them. This payoff is
written as : R (ai) = xi [γaE (va |a)− γyE (vy |a)]. Where va and vy are the intrinsic
(environmental) and extrinsic (for money) values, γa and γy are respectively the
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importance attached by individuals to appearing to be concerned about the envi-
ronment and also of not appearing as greedy, and xi stands for the visibility of
individual decisions. Note that to calculate the two mathematical expectations de-
fining reputation payment, we need the means of the va and the vy in the relevant
population. In other words, individuals have common beliefs about how their society
values both the environment (v¯a) and money (v¯y). In Brekke et al. (2003), indivi-
duals gain from proximity to what they perceive individually as an ideal behavior.
This ideal behavior is defined as the individual decision maximizing a social welfare
function given that everyone else does the same. In Nyborg et al. (2006), the social
dimension is introduced based on a reward associated with self image which takes
account of the external benefits of the individual decision. In both cases, referring to
the social norm introduces the social benefit of the individual decision in the utility.
This necessarily enhances the incentive to contribute to the public good.
Note that empirical works do not systematically validate the role of social norm.
Viscusi et al. (2011)’s empirical contribution distinguishes two types of norms :
personal (i.e. the norms one individual imposes on others) and external (i.e. those
norms people perceive as being imposed by others). External norms take the form of
a societal reference for appropriate behavior or pressure to adopt environmentally
friendly behavior. The authors show that, although the “internal private value”
variable is important, the “social norm” variable, reflecting individual guilt about
not recycling compared to the behavior of neighbors, is not statistically significant.
The empirical analysis in Brekke et al. (2010) shows the importance of the quality
of the information used to form beliefs about others’ recycling behaviors. If the
information is perceived as uncertain, then the impact on the individual of ‘social
learning about their responsibility’ will be lower. In the study by Brekke et al. (2003)
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individuals are able clearly to state their ideal pro-social behavior but in the study
by Nyborg et al. (2006) they have only imperfect knowledge of their self image which
leads them to revise their choices on the basis of payments received, giving rise to
a dynamic adoption process.
An important body of the related literature discusses the crowding-out effect.
As soon as individuals care about what others think about their contribution to
a public good, external incentives stimulate individual contributions but also can
work to contradict internal motivation. Individuals wishing to appear responsible
and not greedy might be afraid of their contribution appearing to peers as motiva-
ted purely by self-interest (e.g. to avoid paying a tax), and may ultimately work to
reduce their contribution. The introduction of a monetary incentive has an ambi-
guous effect according to R (ai) in Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and could create a
negative crowding-out effect, and could result in the individual optimal contribution
ai being enhanced or reduced as a consequence. In Brekke et al. (2003) the introduc-
tion of a fee to finance the furnishing of a public good could reduce the individual
contributions and result in a no contribution equilibrium.
In our model, in contrasts, households do not have a priori beliefs about what
is socially expected. They form their beliefs on the social norm from observing the
people in their neighborhood. This is close to the concept of descriptive norms defi-
ned by Aronson et al. (1999) 1. The augmenting effect of social norm on individual
contributions is not automatic since the household’s neighborhood does not neces-
sarily contribute more to the public good. Since households form their beliefs about
the social norm based on information obtained from within a limited neighborhood,
we suppose that they will be keen to encounter more neighbors in order to improve
their knowledge. This gives rise to a dynamic process in our model. More precisely,
1. Cited in Nyborg et al. (2006).
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we assume that if the household observes a different recycling rate in its immediate
neighborhood, it will revise its estimation of the social norm and make efforts to
meet other neighbors, obtain more information, and refine its estimation of the so-
cial norm. We contribute to the literature by showing that if the individual decision
is influenced by an internalized peer attention, beliefs about others’ intrinsic (envi-
ronmental) and extrinsic (for money) values may be more important than others’
observed behaviors.
3.3 The model
3.3.1 Households’ selective sorting without public policy
The model depicts a simplified economy composed of N households indexed by
i for a finite number of periods. A household creates one unit of waste at each
period because of its consumption. Consumption awards one unit of utility to each
household. A unit of waste can be entirely or partially recycled depending on the
level of the household’s recycling ai. Recycling gives the household satisfaction based
on its ‘environmental preference’ or intrinsic value vai related to selective sorting. It
also implies a cost Ci = cia2i due to the effort, time, materials, and area dedicated
to this activity. Households are supposed to be heterogeneous in relation to both vai
and ci. The intrinsic value vai is supposed to belong to [0, 1]. 2 The cost parameter
ci can take two alternative values : 0 or a strictly positive value. 3
Without public policy, depending on the value of the cost parameter ci household
2. In the model simulation presented in Section 3.4 we suppose that these values are distributed
uniformly on [0, 1].
3. In the model simulation we suppose that ci ∈ {0, 2}.
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i maximizes the following utility payoff to choose its level of recycling activity ai :
U (ai) = vai ai − cia2i + 1 (3.1)
The total amount of recycled waste realized at each period due to the household’s
intrinsic values is A = ∑Ni ai. If the household’s intrinsic values and costs do not
change from period to period, this amount will remain constant.
Since each unit of waste is not entirely recycled (or since A ≤ N) an external
effect is created by the total residual waste N − ∑Ni=1 ai. This external effect is
due to pollution and waste of natural resources implied by residual waste. Note
that, for two reasons the household’s intrinsic value for recycling cannot been seen
as the individual valuation of the associated external cost (or external benefit).
First, we assume that households do not know the exact form of the external cost.
Second, intrinsic values can be related to more general objectives (preservation of the
environment in general, or to altruistic motives). Thus, we suppose that, although
they have intrinsic values, households believe the amount of waste not recycled
(their residual waste) is ‘individually’ negligible regarding the stock-externality. As
a result, the total waste recycled will be insufficient (suboptimal) and public policies
will be needed.
3.3.2 Public policies
An impartial regulator aims to encourage selective sorting in order to tackle
the external costs implied by total residual waste N − ∑Ni=1 ai, taking account of
total welfare. For convenience, we present the external cost as a function of the
global amount of recycled waste in the economy : EC
(∑N
i=1 ai
)
. We suppose that
the external cost decreases with the global amount of recycled waste at a decreasing
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rate (or increases with the global residual waste at an increasing rate) :
EC ′
(
N∑
i=1
ai
)
< 0 and EC ′′
(
N∑
i=1
ai
)
< 0 (3.2)
The specification for the external cost used in the model simulation developed in
Section 3.4 is EC
(∑N
i=1 ai
)
=
(
1∑N
i=1 ai
− 1
N
)
NG, whereG is a constant as discussed
below. 4
Taking account of the external cost, the regulator promotes households’ selective
sorting in order to maximize total welfare, with the help of three kinds of policy :
tax, information, and nudges.
Tax on residual waste
We assume implementation of a “pay–as–you–throw” scheme t by the regulator.
This tax scheme imposes a double burden on households : first, household i pays
t (1− ai) for its unsorted waste, and second, it bears the opportunity cost t (1− ai) vti
of this expense. 5 Under this policy, the payoff function if ci > 0 becomes : 6
U (ai) = vai ai − cia2i + 1− t
(
1 + vti
)
(1− ai) (3.3)
Finally, note that the tax on residual waste takes the form of a revenue trans-
fer, so that the total tax paid ∑Ni=1 t (1− ai), is introduced into the total welfare.
4. G corresponds to the number of households always choosing to recycle the entire unit of waste,
even without public policies. Thus, at the minimal total recycling (
∑N
i=1 ai = G) the external cost
is positive (EC(G) = N −G). Note that for a maximal recycling (i.e. ∑Ni=1 ai = N), the external
cost is 0 (EC(N) = 0).
5. Thus, vti ∈]0; 1] represents the opportunity cost of 1 euro spent on tax.
6. Note that if ci = 0, the payoff function is not fundamentally changed since household i always
chooses ai = 1 and does not incur any tax.
132
3.3 The model
Therefore, the total welfare is written as :
W (a1, · · · , aN) =
N∑
i=1
Ui (ai) +
N∑
i=1
t (1− ai)−
(
1∑N
i=1 ai
− 1
N
)
NG (3.4)
Note that maximizing this welfare function should not result in a zero residual
waste situation. Furthermore, as we show in Section (3.3.5), the recycling effort
required of households will differ according to their individual characteristics.
Information policy
The second form of policy delivers information η > 0 on the social importance
of selective sorting. This information underlines reduction of the residual waste
externality implied by recycling, and waste recovery. This information is supposed to
modify households’ environmental preferences. The environmental value vai increases
as the information is delivered, and is transformed into vai (1−η)
2 . Thus, the household
i utility function with information policy and tax is :
U (ai) = vai (1−η)
2
ai − cia2i + 1− t
(
1 + vti
)
(1− ai) (3.5)
The recycling activity level maximizing (3.5) is denoted by aˆi. The information
level η > 0 is supposed to belong to [0, 1]. Rather unrealistically, we suppose that
delivering information does not imply a cost. Therefore, the regulator’s choice should
be to deliver the maximum information level η = 1. However, in the model simulation
we allow information to take intermediate values. Indeed, our results on the policy-
mix “tax plus information” show that the crowding-out effect measures implied by
the tax are highly sensitive to the level of information η. This allows us to address
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the question of whether information delivery mitigates the crowding-out effect.
Nudge
A policy that acts as a nudge (see Thaler and Sunstein (2008) for a presentation)
is introduced. A nudge is generally considered to be an element that would be ignored
by an individual maximizing his or her utility narrowly defined but works to modify
real observed behaviors. Following a field experiment conducted by Schultz (1999),
the nudge in our model consists of delivering information about what others recycle
in an enlarged neighborhood. 7 If when making its decision household i cares about
what its neighbors do in terms or recycling, or thinks that others’ recycling decisions
influence what others think about its own values vai and vti , this nudge can influence
the household’s selective sorting.
Before studying the effect of different policies, it should be noted that in this mo-
del, the introduction of regulatory attention on waste recycling will on its own (i.e.
whatever the chosen policy or policy mix) modify households’ recycling behaviors.
3.3.3 Households’ selective sorting with public intervention
Three characteristics introduce a profound modification to the way households
choose their respective selective sorting levels. First, we suppose that as soon as the
regulator implements a policy to promote household recycling, public information
on the social importance of selective sorting is delivered. Second, we suppose that
individual selective sorting is (partially) observable by neighbors. Third, we assume
that households care about a peer effect, their reputation, and their self-image, as
underlined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. As a consequence, a reputation payoff is introdu-
7. Schultz (1999) shows that this nudge resulted in an increase in the volume of recycled waste
which persisted over time, even after the experiment stopped.
134
3.3 The model
ced in household i’s utility payoff function, depending on what others believe about
its environmental preferences while observing the household’s recycling decision ai.
When a tax is implemented, household i may also care about how others link
its recycling level ai to its valuation of money vti . We suppose that, as in Bénabou
and Tirole (2006), households will not wish to appear greedy and that this motive
will be taken into account in their reputation payments. As discussed in Section
3.2, households do not know the social recycling norm. We suppose that households
have only common beliefs about how their society values the environment (v¯a) and
cares about money (v¯t). These parameters help households to anticipate how others
estimate their intrinsic and extrinsic values when observing their recycling decisions,
and thus enter the reputation payment. In the absence of more information, they
form their beliefs about the social recycling norm by ‘looking around’ (as described in
3.3.4) and observing the different recycling rates of their neighbors, and calculating
their mean, a¯i in order to estimate the social norm.
The model simulations are developed in Section 3.4 with the following specifica-
tion for the reputation payment function :
R(ai) = xi
(
γti v¯t − γai v¯a
)
(ai − a¯i)2 (3.6)
γai and γti are respectively the importance attached by household i of appearing
concerned about the environment, and the importance attached by household i of
not appearing greedy. The parameter xi is the visibility of household i’s decision. In
the agent-based simulations of the model, xi is a function of the number of neighbors
of household i.
In this function, γai v¯a(ai−a¯i)2 denotes the attention paid to appearing responsible
when choosing the recycling rate ai, and γti v¯t(ai − a¯i)2 denotes to the attention
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paid to not appearing greedy. This reputation payment exhibits some interesting
properties. First, when v¯a/v¯t, the relative importance of the environment to society
is higher than the relative importance of not appearing greedy γti/γai for household
i, the reputation is increasing with ai when ai < a¯i. In other words, in a “relatively
green society” a household will be incited to choose a recycling decision that is
as close as possible to the norm a¯i it perceives. However, in a “relatively greedy
society” (i.e. when v¯t/v¯a > γai /γti) a household will be incited to choose the highest
possible recycling rate to maximize its reputation, since reputation is increasing
for ai > a¯i. Second, a given recycling rate generates more reputation in a more
greedy society since ∂R
∂v¯t
> 0. However, if the value society attaches to environment
increases, reputation implied by a given recycling rate decreases (since ∂R
∂v¯a
< 0).
Finally, reputation increases in the perceived norm a¯i if ai > a¯i in a “relatively
green society”, and if ai < a¯i in a “relatively greedy” society. Finally, note that the
impact of the tax t on the derivative of the reputation payment with respect to ai
is ambiguous.
The total payoff function that household i is supposed to maximize in order to
choose its individual recycling rate is therefore as follows :
Ui (ai, t, η) = vai (1−η)
2
ai − t
(
vti + 1
)
(1− ai)− cia2i + 1 + xi
(
γti v¯t − γai v¯a
)
(ai − a¯i)2
(3.7)
The recycling rate a∗i maximizing (3.7) is given by :
a∗i =
vai + y(vti + 1) + 2xia¯i(γti v¯t − γai v¯a)
2ci + 2xi(γti v¯t − γai v¯a)
(3.8)
Note that the impact of the tax t on the derivative of the reputation payment
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with respect to ai when ai = a∗i (t) is ambiguous, so that a crowding-out effect may
appear in households’ decisions.
3.3.4 Agent-based simulation
The presence of a reputation payment in the household payoff functions has an
important consequence. Since households care about what others think about their
motivations, and care also about others’ recycling levels, in order to make their
own selective sorting decisions they need to know what the recycling social norm
is. Indeed, to calculate R(ai, t, η) requires information on what others do : a¯ the
average of others’ recycling decision a∗i .
We suppose that households have limited capacity to perceive the selective sor-
ting propensity of others and are conscious of this limitation. Thus, households will
seek to discover the social norm a¯ by meeting people in what we call a ‘socialization
process’. During this process a household i counts the number of other households
she meets and calculates the mean of others’ observed selective sorting propensities
a¯i.
This process is described using a dynamics à la Schelling (1969). At each per-
iod, two different situations can emerge for the household’s desire to commit to
further meetings. The first situation is when the mean of others’ selective sorting
propensities a¯i calculated by the household is equal to its own selective sorting pro-
pensity a∗i . 8 In this situation we suppose that, feeling in line with her neighborhood,
the household does not seek further information. The second situation arises when
a¯i 6= a∗i . If the household feels out of kilter with its neighbors, we suppose that it
will make efforts to get more information on others’ recycling activity. Note that
8. In the model simulation a tolerance threshold of ±3% is introduced.
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information delivery and tax are public policies that we keep fixed during these
household interactions. The nudge which consists of giving information on others’
recycling rates in a wider neighborhood, will be activated when at least 75% of the N
households decide to stop interacting with others, and affects only these households.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the dynamics of the simulation model.
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Figure 3.1 – Dynamics of Agent-based simulation
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3.3.5 Three types of households
Households are supposed heterogeneous on both parameters ‘i’. Depending on the
configuration of these parameters, three types of households can be distinguished.
First there are G Green households characterized by :
0 < vai ≤ 1, 0 < vti ≤ 1, ci = 0, and γai = γti = 0, for i = 1, · · · , G (3.9)
The assumptions in (3.9) imply that Green households are not concerned about
what others think about their intrinsic valuation of the environment (γai = 0) or
whether they appear greedy (γti = 0). 9 Under these assumptions, and taking account
of tax and information policies, the payoff function of Green households is given by :
Ui (ai, t, η) = vai (1−η)
2
ai − t
(
vti + 1
)
(1− ai) + 1 (3.10)
Without public policies, and whatever the value of vai , Green households always
choose to recycle the entire unit of waste : ai = 1 maximizing (3.1) or (3.10). As
a result, public policies have no effect on them. Green households will never pay
the ‘pay–as–you–throw’ tax, and even if provision of information increases Green
households’ intrinsic values, this does not imply a decision about a higher level of
recycling. Finally, since γai = γti = 0, Green households do not attach importance to
what others think about them, and will never engage in the dynamics allowing an
opinion on the social recycling norm.
9. Note that these Green Households are different from the ‘green consumers’ in ?. These green
consumers choose to preserve the environment because of moral norms and beliefs about others’
behavior. This implies a high level of vai in absolute terms. In our model, Green Households choose
a high level of recycling because its benefits are greater than its costs.
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The second group comprises the R Red households characterized by :
vai = 0, 0 < vti ≤ 1, ci > 0, and γai = γyi = 0, for i = 1, · · · , R (3.11)
The assumptions in (3.11) imply that red households do not value the environ-
ment. Thus, information policy has no effect on their behaviors. Since they do not
care what others think about them (γai = γti = 0), they never try to discover the
social recycling norm. Their recycling activity cost is strictly positive (ci = 2 in
the model simulation) resulting in their always choosing not to develop recycling
activity if no tax on residual waste is implemented (i.e. maximizing (3.1)). However,
as soon as a tax is implemented, Red households’ optimal recycling decisions are
a∗i =
t(vti+1)
2ci , maximizing their payoff functions as shown below :
Ui (ai, t) = −t
(
vti + 1
)
(1− ai)− cia2i + 1 (3.12)
Finally, the Y Yellow households are the third group whose members are cha-
racterized by :
0 < vai < 1, 0 < vti < 1, ci > 0, 0 < γai ≤ 1, and 0 < γti ≤ 1, for i = 1, · · · , Y
(3.13)
Yellow households value the environment and selective sorting, as well as money.
They care about what other people think about their environmental commitment
and whether they appear self-interested. This requires information on the social
recycling norm which they try to discover by interacting with others. If both a tax
and an information policy are implemented, the group’s utility functions are given
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by (3.7) and their recycling decisions by (3.8).
3.3.6 Measuring the Social influence
We compute the impact of social influence for the Yellow households population
as the mean of the difference between a∗i−aˆi. A negative mean suggests that negative
crowding out dominates positive crowding effect (and vice versa). This measure is
imperfect since positive differences between a∗i and aˆi are compensated by negative
ones. However, it captures a net effect. For a better appreciation of social influence we
complete this first quantitative measure with qualitative information on the number
of negative individual social influence effects and the number of positive ones. This
highlights how the composition of the Yellow households population regarding social
influence evolves with tax changes.
3.3.7 Measuring the crowding-out effect
The presence of the reputation payment in theYellow households’ utility function
(3.7), suggests a crowding-out effect. In the first order conditions, the derivative of
the reputation payment, ∂R(ai, t)/∂ai = r(ai, t) can react differently to the tax rate :
∂r(ai, t)/∂t can be either positive or negative. Thus, an increase in the tax rate has
ambiguous consequences for Yellow households’ recycling decisions a∗i . A crowding-
out effect occurs when the decision a∗i solution of the maximization of (3.7) is smaller
than the decision aˆi = v
a
i
(1−η)2
2ci maximizing (3.5) without reputation payment (i.e.
with xi = 0). Note that Yellow households do not systematically exhibit a crowding-
out effect. This possibility depends on the value of t and on the household’s position
in the socialization process (i.e. on what others in the household’s neighborhood
do).
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The model simulation allows us to estimate the magnitude of the crowding-out
effect. Another way to appreciate the crowding-out effect is by looking at the signs
of the different individual ∂r(ai, t)/∂t and their averages.
3.4 Results
The simulations are implemented using Netlogo, an Agent-Based Modeling Plat-
form. Each simulation considers 200 households with randomly drawn individual
parameter values vai , vti , γai , and γti . The initial conditions for the “population para-
meters” are v¯a = 0.45, and v¯y = 0.5.
The model is simulated on four different configurations. In the first configuration
the household population is composed 10% Red households, 20% Green households,
and 70% Yellow households. In the second configuration the respective shares are
33% Red households, 33% Green households, and 34% Yellow households. In the
third configuration there are 60% Red households, 20% Green households, and 20%
Yellow households. In the fourth configuration there are 20% Red households, 60%
Green households, and 20% Yellow households.
In this framework, each household can have 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 neighbors and cal-
culates a¯i observing the different a∗i in the neighborhood thus defined. In order to
maximize its utility, a Yellow household has to know the social recycling norm and
tries to estimate it according to the socialization process described in Section (3.3.4).
The process lasts 200 periods (runs).
Each tax and information policy, t and η, takes 10 values between 0 and 1, so
that 100 couples (t, η) are considered. Each configuration (t, η) is simulated 100
times with 200 runs per simulation.
Below, we first present the policy impact on welfare. We then discuss the increase
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in the crowding-out effect and the consequences of introducing a nudge.
3.4.1 Results on welfare
The possibility to set a tax maximizing total welfare is depicted in figure (3.2)
which shows the simulation results for welfare in the configuration of 70% Yellow,
20% Green, and 10% Red households. Figure (3.2) confirms the complementarity
between tax and information policies. There is a clear optimal policy mix. Under
the selected population parameters it corresponds to a moderate tax rate combined
with a high level of information. Note that this result is linked to the fact that, in
the model, information delivery is costless for government. The results are similar
results for the other population configurations.
Figure 3.2 – 10% Red - 20% Green - 70% Yellow
The total welfare
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3.4.2 Results for households’ recycling decisions
Figure (3.3) considers averages of ai (in red) maximizing (3.1) without public po-
licies, aˆi (in blue) maximizing (3.5) under public policies without social interaction,
and a∗i (in yellow) maximizing (3.7) under public policies with social interaction, for
a population composed of 10% Red, 20% Green, and 70% Yellow households. When
the population composition exhibits a sufficiently large share of Yellow households
(figure 3.3), we observe a real distinction between the three recycling levels. A stri-
king result is that the average of the a∗i is systematically higher than the average
of the aˆi. This result confirms previous results which show that the effect of social
influence on recycling is positive. However, it is obtained for the selected population
parameters v¯a(= 0.45) < v¯y(= 0.5). What happens with a change of parameters ?
The robustness checks presented in Section 3.4.5 show that the average of the a∗i
are sensitive to variations of v¯a and v¯y, making it possible for configurations where
a∗i − aˆi on average to be negative. If households believe that v¯a > v¯y this result
can appear. This situation is depicted in Figure (3.4) which depicts the simulation
results with v¯a = 0.6 and v¯y = 0.4.
Figure 3.3 – 10% Red - 20% Green
- 70% Yellow with v¯a = 0.45 and
v¯y = 0.5
Figure 3.4 – 10% Red - 20% Green
- 70% Yellow with v¯a = 0.6 and
v¯y = 0.4
Averages of recycling rates ai, aˆi, and a∗i
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3.4.3 Results for Social influence and the Crowding-out ef-
fect
In order to explore the impact of social influence on recycling we measure the
difference between households’ recycling decisions when households’ interact with
proximate households (a∗i maximizing (3.7), i.e. recycling decisions that take account
of neighbors), and when they do not (aˆi maximizing (3.5), i.e. isolated recycling
decisions). In these two situations households face the same policy mix (tax plus
information provision) so that the differences observed in their recycling decisions
is attributable to neighborhood influence. The results are represented in Figures
(3.5)-(3.8). In the four population configurations considered, the evolution profiles
of the average of a∗i − aˆi observed are similar, although the absolute values (i.e.
the magnitude of the gap between a∗i and aˆi) are different. Figure (3.5) confirms
our previous observation in figure (3.3) that the largest gap is observed for high
values of residual waste tax in the presence of more Yellow households. In each of
the configurations considered, information provision delays the impact of the social
influence because of the implied increase in households’ intrinsic values. Finally,
comparing Figures (3.7) and (3.8), we observe that social influence is greater for
green rather than red neighborhoods.
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Figure 3.5 – 10% Red - 20% Green
- 70% Yellow
Figure 3.6 – 33% Red - 33% Green
- 34% Yellow
Figure 3.7 – 60% Red - 20% Green
- 20% Yellow
Figure 3.8 – 20% Red - 60% Green
- 20% Yellow
Social Influence : Average of a∗i − aˆi
147
Chapitre 3 - Public policies for households recycling
The average of a∗i−aˆi is always positive. This does not mean that every individual
a∗i − aˆi is also positive. It indicates only that the sum of the positive households, in
absolute value, is greater than the sum of the negative ones. This is confirmed in
Figure (3.9)-(3.10) which reports the number of negative a∗i − aˆi observed.
Figure 3.9 – 10% Red - 20% Green
- 70% Yellow
Figure 3.10 – 33% Red - 33%
Green - 34% Yellow
Number of negative a∗i − aˆi observed
Figures (3.9)-(3.10) show clearly that the negative social influence effect is do-
minated by a positive effect. For example, in the first situation (Figure 3.9), social
influence has a negative effect on 60-64 households among the 200 Yellow households
that care about social influence in this population configuration. However, whate-
ver the configuration observed, there are always negative gaps between individual
a∗i − aˆi. 10
Figures (3.11)-(3.12) give information on the crowding-out effect. We concen-
trate on the average of the derivatives ∂r(ai, t)/∂t observed. By definition (cf. Sec-
tion 3.3.7), a crowding–out effect emerges if this derivative is negative. Therefore,
the observed mean gives information on the sign of the net crowding-out. Profiles
seem similar in both configurations. In both configurations, the crowding-out effect
increases with low tax rates and then decreases. Furthermore, in both cases the
10. In the second configuration (figure 3.10), social influence negatively affects 29-32 households
among the 68 Yellow households that care about social influence.
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Figure 3.11 – 10% Red - 20%
Green - 70% Yellow
Figure 3.12 – 33% Red - 33%
Green - 34% Yellow
Crowding-out effect : Average of ∂r(ai, t)/∂t
information policy seems to have ambiguous effect on the crowding-out effect.
Another way to evaluate the crowding-out effect is depicted in Figures (3.13) -
(3.14) which report the numbers of positive (in red) and negative (in blue) ∂r(ai, t)/∂t
in the first and the second configurations. 11 We observe that both negative and posi-
tive crowding-out coexist within the population, and that a positive effect dominates
with the population parameters chosen.
Figure 3.13 – 10% Red - 20%
Green - 70% Yellow
Figure 3.14 – 33% Red - 33%
Green - 34% Yellow
Crowding-out effect : Number of positive (red) and negative (blue) ∂r(ai, t)/∂t
So far we have used v¯a(= 0.45) < v¯y(= 0.5). These value were calculated on a
population of 1000 uniformly distributed households. In the following experiment,
11. Observations are similar in the two other configurations.
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we have the situation where the households beliefs are such that v¯a > v¯y) with
v¯a = 0.6 and v¯y = 0.4. In other words, households believe that the population is
more environmentally friendly and less greedy. The results are presented in Figures
(3.16) and (3.15). We observe that the social influence and crowding-out effects,
on average have a negative impact (Figures 3.16 and 3.15). Figure 3.15 shows that
social influence decreases with a tax, and that the largest gaps between a∗i and aˆi
are observed for high values of a tax on residual waste. Figure (3.16) shows a clear
negative crowding-out effect. This crowding-out effect is stable until intermediate
values of the tax, and increases in absolute value for higher tax rates.
Figure 3.15 – Social Influence :
Average of a∗i − aˆi
Figure 3.16 – Crowding-out effect :
Average of ∂r(ai, t)/∂t
10% Red - 20% Green - 70% Yellow with v¯a = 0.6 and v¯y = 0.4
3.4.4 Measuring the nudge impact
Following Schultz (1999)’s experiment, a nudge consisting of information provi-
sion on what others recycle in an enlarged neighborhood, is introduced in the model.
In the “socialization process” Yellow households form their evaluation of the social
norm a¯i using the a∗i for eight neighbors instead of four. The nudge is activated for
a given household as soon as it stops the socialization process, while 75% of the
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population does not change. The nudge targets households which recycle at a level
under than a threshold fixed by the regulator. In our simulations this threshold is
fixed at (1+v¯a)2ci .
Figures (3.17)–(3.18) derive from the first configuration of the population com-
position (10% Red - 20% Green - 70% Yellow). Figure (3.17) depicts the effects of a
nudge on crowding-out via ∂r(ai, t)/∂t. Figure (3.17) shows that a nudge moderate
the crowding out effect, especially when the tax is high. Figure (3.18) confirms this
result presenting the effect of a nudge on social influence measured by a∗i − aˆi. This
“negative” result might seem surprising but confirms what Schultz (1999)’s expe-
riment shows : A nudge having the effect of enlarging the neighborhood involved in
constructing social influence does not necessarily imply an increase in the volume
of waste recycled. A “positive” result depends on the neighborhood recycling more
than the individual household seeking peer approval.
Figure 3.17 – Average of
∂r(ai, t)/∂t with (yellow) and
without (red) the nudge
Figure 3.18 – a∗i − aˆi with (yellow)
and without (red) the nudge
3.4.5 Robustness checks
In the baseline scenario the mean values of vai , and vti are fixed respectively at
0.5 and 0.45. These values were obtained by calculating the mean observed values
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on a randomly uniformly distributed population of 1000 individuals. We also tested
the impact of a variation in each of the parameters separately (holding the others
fixed) on our results (optimal decision recycling, qualitative crowding-out and social
influence). We perform extensive Monte Carlo simulations to get rid of simulation
variability. The results presented below refer to averages over several replications. All
the simulation results refer to 1000 Monte Carlo independent runs, each involving
200 time steps (households’ moves in the model). The simulations are run for three
different cases. The first case (discussed below) considers an ‘intermediate’ policy
mix (t = η = 0.6). The other two cases, a ‘weak’ policy mix (t = η = 0.1), and a
‘strong’ policy mix (t = η = 1), focus on an extreme policy mix and are presented
in the appendix.
Figure 3.19 – The impact of v¯a on
a∗i
Figure 3.20 – The impact of v¯t on
a∗i
The impact of parameters’ variation on Optimal Recycling Decision (a∗i ) with
t = η = 0.6
Regarding the impact of these two parameters on the optimal recycling decisions,
we observe a decreasing relation between the population mean intrinsic value and
(regardless of policy level) the optimal recycling decision (figure 3.19). If individuals
believe that their society has a high v¯a, they expect to gain less in terms of reputation
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from adoption of a high recycling level. This effect decreases the mean recycling
decision observed. The confidence intervals observed for the different values of the
optimal recycling decisions show that the variations in v¯a significantly affect the
optimal recycling decision.
The variations in v¯a have a similar impact social influence (a∗i − aˆi) (Figure
3.21), since the aˆis do not depend on v¯a. As a consequence we can conclude that the
difference observed between a∗i and aˆi in absolute value is increasing with v¯a.
Figure 3.21 – The impact of v¯a on
a∗i − aˆi
Figure 3.22 – The impact of v¯t on
a∗i − aˆi
The impact of parameters’ variation on Social influence (a∗i − aˆi) with t = η = 0.6
We observe a increasing relation between the mean extrinsic value of the popu-
lation v¯y and the decision about recycling level (figure 3.20). Variation of v¯y has a
positive effect on the reputation payment. The confidence intervals observed clearly
confirm this finding. Thus, we can conclude that the variations in v¯y significantly
affect individuals’ recycling decisions. This result is confirmed in Figure (3.22) which
depicts the impact of v¯y on a∗i − aˆi. We observe also that a∗i − aˆi can be positive or
negative. Thus, social influence is positive for low values of v¯a and high values of v¯y
but is negative for high values of v¯a and low values of v¯y.
The trends are similar for the crowding-out effect. The increase in the population
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Figure 3.23 – The impact of v¯a on
∂r(ai, t)/∂t
Figure 3.24 – The impact of v¯t on
∂r(ai, t)/∂t
The impact of parameters’ variation on Crowding-out ( ∂r(ai, t)/∂t) with
t = η = 0.6
mean intrinsic value v¯a exacerbates the crowding-out effect (figure 3.23). For low
values of the mean intrinsic value we observe a positive crowding-out which becomes
negative when the mean intrinsic value is fixed at a sufficiently high level. The results
are reversed for an increase in the population mean extrinsic value v¯y in Figure
(3.24). As v¯y increases, the negative crowding-out effect diminishes in absolute value
and becomes positive.
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3.5 Conclusion
This work explored the issue of the peer effect and the influence of social approval
on households’ recycling decisions. We consider a policy mix composed of a “pay–as–
you–throw” tax, provision of information on the social importance of recycling, and
a ’nudge’ in the form of information on others’ recycling activity. Using a model and
computational simulations, our results show that the peer effect is not systematically
positive. Indeed, this effect depends on the environmental policies implemented, and
on the composition of the population considered (i.e. the importance of households
sensitive to the crowding-out effect in the population considered), and on households’
beliefs about whether society is more environmentally friendly than it is greedy. Our
results show that the sign of average social influence depends on the population
parameters. If households believe that the mean extrinsic value is greater than the
mean intrinsic value v¯y > v¯a, social influence is positive, as well as the crowding-out
effect. In the reverse setting these effects are negative. The nudge policy is tested as
a complementary policy to tax and information. This policy yields mixed results. On
the one hand, it intensifies the importance of social influence on individual recycling
decisions, and increases the responsiveness of individual decisions to the tax. On the
other hand, it moderates the crowding-out effect.
3.6 Appendix
Complementary robustness checks
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The impact of parameters (v¯a)’
variations on Optimal Recycling
Decision (a∗i )
The impact of parameters (v¯y)’
variations on Optimal Recycling
Decision (a∗i )
The impact of parameters (v¯a)’
variations on Crowding-out
(∂r(ai, t)/∂t)
The impact of parameters (v¯y)’
variations on Crowding-out
(∂r(ai, t)/∂t)
The impact of parameters (v¯a)’
variations on Social influence
(a∗i − aˆi)
The impact of parameters (v¯y)’
variations on Social influence
(a∗i − aˆi)
Figure 3.25 – With lower public policies t = η = 0.1
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The impact of parameters (v¯a)’
variations on Optimal Recycling
Decision (a∗i )
The impact of parameters (v¯y)’
variations on Optimal Recycling
Decision (a∗i )
The impact of parameters (v¯a)’
variations on Crowding-out
(∂r(ai, t)/∂t)
The impact of parameters (v¯y)’
variations on Crowding-out
(∂r(ai, t)/∂t)
The impact of parameters (v¯a)’
variations on Social influence
(a∗i − aˆi)
The impact of parameters (v¯y)’
variations on Social influence
(a∗i − aˆi)
Figure 3.26 – With lower public policies t = η = 1
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Cette thèse présente les résultats d’une recherche sur les déterminants de recy-
clages individuels des ménages. Elle part du principe qu’une meilleure compréhen-
sion de ces comportements est nécessaire au choix des politiques publiques visant à
promouvoir le tri sélectif des déchets ménagers.
Dans un premier chapitre, nous avons présenté un examen approfondi de la lit-
térature économique sur la gestion des déchets. Si la problématique peut sembler
resserrée, les travaux sur la question ont cependant des motivations très différentes.
Nous nous sommes d’abord intéressés aux travaux conduits exclusivement sur l’as-
pect financier de la gestion des déchets, et excluant la question environnementale.
En effet, ces premiers travaux considéraient la gestion des déchets comme une pres-
tation de service dont on devait trouver la meilleure organisation pour en minimiser
le coût. Afin de saisir l’étendue de cette littérature, nous avons ensuite présenté des
travaux plaçant la dimension financière des politiques équipementières au second
plan, pour se concentrer sur leur dimension environnementale. Ceux-ci proposent
d’estimer la valeur que la société attribue au recyclage des déchets ménagers. Ces
études d’évaluation contingente cherchent ainsi à justifier l’intervention publique
et/ou son échelle à partir du consentement à payer des individus.
Le choix qui apparaît ainsi à travers ces travaux de traiter les aspects budgétaires
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et environnementaux indépendamment n’apportait pas de réponse à certaines in-
terrogations, notamment celle de savoir sur quelle base comparer les alternatives de
financement, ni ne permettait de justifier le choix des politiques publiques à mettre
en œuvre. Autrement dit, la question n’est pas seulement de fournir un service pu-
blic de collecte des déchets mais de mettre en œuvre des politiques qui visent à
inciter les ménages à adopter un comportement de recyclage. Les travaux dans le
champ explorant cette thématique ont été présentés dans un troisième temps. Un
premier type de travaux envisage de manière très classique les incitations monétaires
et l’apport d’information comme politique incitative qu’un régulateur peut mettre
en œuvre pour stimuler le recyclage des ménages. Ces études ont pu démontrer l’im-
pact positif attendu sur le comportement des individus. Concernant les politiques
incitatives classiques, il est nécessaire que les producteurs de déchets génèrent des
biens recyclables pour que le signal prix agisse. Les politiques d’informations quant
à elles, agissent en deux temps : d’une part, en amont, via une prise de conscience de
la production des déchets, incitant des changements dans les habitudes d’achat des
ménages vers des biens moins gourmands en ressource et en emballage, et d’autre
part, en aval, en informant et éduquant sur les programmes de recyclage, de récupé-
ration et de réutilisation rendant l’acte de tri moins complexe. Toutefois, les travaux
économiques considèrent l’outil informationnel comme un outil complémentaire aux
instruments économiques.
Enfin, de manière originale, nous avons présenté une littérature croissante considé-
rant que le tri sélectif fait partie d’un comportement plus large des consommateurs
mu non seulement par l’intérêt privé, mais aussi par sa dimension environnementale
et sociale. Ces travaux s’inscrivent dans une littérature en économie comportemen-
tale qui essaye de dépasser le cadre traditionnel de la décision ancrée simplement
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dans la maximisation de l’intérêt privé. Les normes sociales, l’approbation sociale,
la recherche de l’estime des autres, l’altruisme et les choix d’autrui, deviennent alors
des déterminants importants étudiés, alors même que les économistes les excluaient
jusqu’à récemment de leurs analyses. Outre les travaux récents nous présentons aussi
les travaux de psychologie et de sociologie portant sur le tri des déchets qui ont pu
être des sources d’inspiration pour ces études économiques.
Dans notre second chapitre, nous nous sommes intéressés aux déterminants
d’adoption d’un comportement de recyclage. Nous avons particulièrement voulu
mettre l’accent sur cet aspect comportemental révélé au chapitre précédent en inté-
grant l’influence des pairs. Les travaux existants étaient essentiellement développés
par des sociologues et/ou psychologues. Nous avons donc étudiés ce sujet à l’aide
de données microéconomiques issues d’une enquête que nous avons réalisée en ré-
gion Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur. Les résultats de notre étude économétrique cor-
roborent la majorité des résultats de la littérature. En effet, sans surprise, les préfé-
rences pro-environnementales (vs non–environnementales) des individus influencent
positivement (vs négativement) l’adoption d’un comportement de recyclage. L’hy-
pothèse que nous émettions concernant la qualité du service public et l’activité de
recyclage, s’est avérée significativement positive. Plus les infrastructures mises en
place par les collectivités sont efficientes, plus les individus adoptent un comporte-
ment de tri.
L’originalité de notre papier réside dans l’intérêt que nous portons à l’influence so-
ciale. Nous nous sommes pour cela concentrés sur deux points, premièrement la
façon dont se comporte l’entourage des personnes (voisins, proches) et deuxième-
ment, la manière dont les autres individus perçoivent leur façon de se comporter.
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Notre modèle économétrique a montré qu’il existait effectivement une relation si-
gnificative et négative entre l’influence des pairs et l’adoption d’un comportement
de recyclage. Or la littérature montre certes l’impact de l’influence sociale, mais cet
effet est considéré comme positif. Ce résultat n’est toutefois par surprenant dans la
mesure où l’influence sociale est considérée comme une norme sociale que les indi-
vidus cherchent à atteindre en observant le comportement de leur pair. Il est donc
possible que les individus soient influencés positivement (si le comportement d’autrui
est supérieur à leur propre comportement) ou négativement (dans le cas inverse) se-
lon la composition de leur entourage. La norme sociale de recyclage en région PACA
est faible puisque les taux de recyclage le sont. Les individus de notre échantillon
se déclarent majoritairement recycleurs, cette relation négative peut alors paraître
surprenante. Pour nous les individus estiment leur geste futile aux regards du com-
portement de leurs voisins. Ces résultats, bien que contraires aux études pionnières
dans ce domaine, réaffirment le r ôle crucial que peuvent avoir les instruments com-
portementaux tel que l’influence sociale, sur le comportement des individus. Afin de
mieux comprendre le rôle de l’influence sociale sur les individus, nous pensons que
de telles analyses doivent être normalisées.
Le troisième chapitre s’inscrit dans la continuité de notre étude empirique mais
recourt cependant à une analyse théorique reposant sur des simulations Multi-
agents. Les simulations numériques du modèle nous ont permis de quantifier l’in-
fluence sociale et l’effet d’éviction total sur les déchets résiduels, ainsi que d’obser-
ver l’évolution des décisions optimales de recyclage avec ou sans interaction sociale.
L’influence sociale est observée par la différence entre les décisions de recyclage des
ménages lorsqu’ils interagissent avec leurs voisins et prennent en compte le compor-
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tement de ces derniers dans leur décision de recyclage, et la décision de recyclage
des ménages isolés c’est-à-dire des ménages qui ignorent le comportement de leurs
voisins dans leur décision de recyclages. Les deux situations sont comparées sous
un même régime de taxe et d’information. Les différences observées peuvent être
positives comme négatives, ce qui signifie que le comportement de recyclage de l’en-
tourage peut impacter à la hausse comme à la baisse les décisions de recyclage des
ménages.
L’effet d’éviction est mesuré par l’appréciation de l’impact de la taxe sur l’accrois-
sement d’utilité due à la réputation qu’engendre une augmentation du taux de recy-
clage décidé. Celle-ci peut être, comme l’influence sociale, positive comme négative.
Nous constatons que l’effet d’éviction est plus important pour les valeurs hautes de
la taxe avec une population composée majoritairement de ménages attentifs à leur
entourage. Les politiques informationnelles quant à elles semblent retarder l’impact
de l’effet d’éviction, et ce peu importe le type de population considéré. Cela peut
s’expliquer par le fait que toute augmentation de l’information impacte à la hausse
les valeurs intrinsèques des ménages. Toutefois, lorsqu’on s’intéresse au signe de l’ef-
fet d’éviction dans le cas de notre modèle de base, on s’aperçoit que celui-ci est
toujours positif. Cela ne signifie pas que tous les ménages ont un effet d’éviction
positif mais seulement que celui-ci est dominant. C’est pourquoi en plus de mesurer
l’effet d’éviction, nous avons cherché à mesurer les fréquences d’apparition de l’effet
d’éviction positif et négatif. Quelque soit la configuration initiale de la population, il
existe à chaque fois des effets positifs et négatifs. Dans une situation où les ménages
attentifs à leur entourage sont majoritairement représentés, et avec les paramètres
que nous avons fixés dans notre modèle de base, l’effet d’éviction positif est plus
fréquent. De plus le niveau de la taxe impacte également différemment les décisions
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de recyclage. Par exemple, l’effet positif augmente avec le niveau de taxe lorsque
les ménages attentifs à leur entourage sont nombreux. Un autre point intéressant
concerne la situation où les paramètres de la population ont été inversés, c’est-à-dire
la situation où la valeur intrinsèque moyenne est supérieure à la valeur extrinsèque
moyenne. Dans ce cas, on s’aperçoit que l’impact sur les décisions optimales de
recyclage, l’influence sociale et l’effet d’éviction agissent de manière inversée. Cela
signifie que les croyances des individus concernant les valeurs intrinsèques et extrin-
sèques de la population sont très importantes, et semblent impacter plus la décision
des individus que l’observation qu’ils ont effectivement du comportement des autres.
Les Nudges sont testées comme une politique complémentaire à l’impôt et à l’in-
formation. Cette politique donne des résultats mitigés. La politique de “coup de
pouce” n’implique pas nécessairement une augmentation du niveau des déchets re-
cyclés. Ce résultat n’apparaît que lorsque le quartier (voisinage) considéré recycle
plus que le ménage qui recherche l’approbation sociale. De plus, la différence entre le
recyclage optimal avec influence sociale et le recyclage optimal sans influence sociale
augmente plus vite avec la taxe lorsque les nudges sont activés. Pour les ménages
attentifs à leur entourage, le nudge atténue ainsi l’importance de l’influence sociale
sur la décision individuelle de recyclage.
Pour terminer, il convient d’indiquer que ce travail ouvre de nouvelles voies de
recherche et d’approfondissement. Tout d’abord, nous pensons que l’appréciation
empirique de l’influence sociale dans la décision individuelle de tri pourrait être ap-
profondie à partir d’une enquête spécifiquement dédiée à cette question. Il s’agirait
ici d’isoler les canaux les plus importants par lesquels elle se manifeste (connais-
sance du comportement d’autrui, croyances a priori sur une norme de comporte-
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ment, attention à l’image de soi, degré d’altruisme etc.). Les résultats de cette étude
pourraient permettre d’affiner les recommandations en matière de politique.
Enfin, alors que nous avons décidé de nous focaliser dans cette thèse sur les consom-
mateurs, excluant volontairement les producteurs de déchets, nous envisageons de
compléter ce travail en prenant en compte ces derniers. L’objectif sera double. Nous
envisageons tout d’abord d’étudier la complémentarité / substituabilité des poli-
tiques publiques concernant les consommateurs et les producteurs. Cette étude nous
permettrait d’étudier ensuite comment la modification des comportements de tri des
ménages en aval peut inciter les producteurs à modifier leur offre. Le simple jeu du
marché est-il suffisant ? Des mécanismes de réputation peuvent-ils la compléter ?
Sous quelle forme etc. ?
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Résumé
Le constat d’un volume de déchets en augmentation constante en France et dans le monde
appelle des études permettant de comprendre les comportements de tri des ménages. Cette
thèse s’inscrit dans cette perspective et a pour ambition de comprendre comment modifier le
comportement des consommateurs afin que ces derniers réduisent leurs déchets. Nous présen-
tons tout d’abord une revue de la littérature analysant les différentes politiques publiques en
matière de gestion des déchets. L’approche traditionnelle consistant à dire que les individus
répondent avant tout à un comportement rationnel, la recherche de gain, a ses limites. Nous
soutenons l’idée que des politiques spécifiques prenant en compte les facteurs comportementaux
– tels que l’émotion et l’influence de l’interaction sociale – sont nécessaires dans l’élaboration
des politiques publiques en faveur du recyclage. Dans un second temps, nous nous intéressons
aux déterminants du tri sélectif à partir de données issues d’une enquête originale auprès de 694
habitants de la région Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur. A l’aide d’un modèle probit, nous estimons
la probabilité d’adopter ou non un comportement de tri sélectif. Ce modèle teste les hypothèses
étudiées jusqu’ici principalement par les sociologues et les psychologues sur le tri sélectif et que
reprend l’économie comportementale. Notre analyse empirique démontre que l’influence sociale
impacte négativement le recyclage. Enfin, nous complétons cette étude avec un modèle multi-
agent qui cherche à expliquer le tri des déchets et l’impact des politiques publiques. Notre modèle
considère des ménages hétérogènes choisissant de recycler selon quatre caractéristiques : leurs
préférences environnementales, le coût d’opportunité de la taxe, le coût du tri et leur image de
soi. Trois politiques publiques sont testées : l’information, la taxe et les “Nudges”. L’originalité
du modèle réside dans la modélisation des interactions entre les ménages nécessaire pour former
les croyances sur une norme de recyclage permettant d’évaluer l’image de soi. Nous soulignons
combien les décisions individuelles de recyclage dépendent de ces interactions, et comment l’ef-
ficacité des politiques publiques est affectée en raison d’un effet d’éviction.
Mots clés : Déchet, Économie appliquée, Économie comportementale, Modèle de simulation
multi-agent, Politique publique, Recyclage, Régulation environnementale, Simulation numé-
rique.
Abstract
The observation of a positive trend in the amount of waste in France and in the world has
called for studies explaining household sorting behavior. This thesis lies in this perspective and
aims at determining how to lead consumers to reduce their waste. We first present a review
of the literature analyzing the portfolio of waste management public policies. We discuss the
limits of the traditional approach stating that individuals adopt a rational behavior, seeking
utility gains. Instead we support the idea that addressing behavioral factors - such as emotions
and social influence, is required for public policies supporting recycling behavior to succeed.
In a second step, we investigate the determinants of sorting behavior by building an original
survey on 694 individuals in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region. Our study combines and
tests hypotheses first developed by sociologists and psychologists with concepts from behavioral
economics. We use a probit model to estimate the probability to adopt a selective sorting be-
havior. Our empirical analysis shows that social influence negatively impacts recycling. Finally,
we complete this study with an agent-based model which seeks to explain the sorting of waste
as well as how such behavior is impacted by public policies. Our model considers heterogeneous
households whose recycling decision is affected by four elements : individual environmental pre-
ferences and self-image, the opportunity cost of a tax on sorting, and the cost of sorting. Three
public policies are tested : information, tax and “nudges”. The originality of the model lies in
the modeling of interactions between households. These interactions in turn affect individual
beliefs about a recycling norm, impacting self-image. We emphasize that individual recycling
decisions depend on these interactions, and that a crowding-out effect reduces the effectiveness
of public policies.
Keywords : Agent based Model, Behavioral economics, Computational Techniques, Econome-
tric Modelling, Environmental regulation, Household recycling, Public Policies, Waste.
